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Abstract 
Research has demonstrated that hate is a protective emotional response to perceived evil, yet the 
dimensions by which people perceive evil have not been clearly identified. Research has also 
indicated that it is evil to feel hate, which presents an interesting paradox: if hate protects us from 
evil, then how can it be evil to feel hate? The present research attempts to identify the 
dimensions of evil and elucidate the relationship between hate and evil by comparing it to the 
relationship between dislike and evil. Study 1 tested how participants identified evil in third 
person scenarios. As predicted, evil was labeled most often in scenarios that depicted intentional 
acts on the part of the target, though contrary to predictions evil was not labeled as often in 
scenarios that depicted responsible acts on the part of the target. Study 2 relied on participants’ 
own experiences of dislike and hate, or the experiences of someone, they knew toward either a 
group or individual. As predicted, hate and dislike differed in intensity and kind, though less so 
in kind than anticipated. Also as predicted, differentiations emerged within hate that suggested 
that hate toward groups, specifically when experienced by others, is considered more evil and 
less justified than hate experienced by the self. The consistency of these results with extant 
theories of hate and evil are discussed as well as potential explanations for the differential 
relationship of hate and evil.  
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Introduction 
Martin Heidegger was one of the foremost thinkers of the twentieth century. He 
contributed to many schools of thought and provided a foundation for many thinkers who came 
after him. He was also a zealous Nazi. An examination of Heidegger’s life and philosophy has 
led to a decades-long debate about whether or not his ideas should still hold influence. One 
author has called for the entire canon of Heidegger’s work to be treated as hate speech (Faye, 
2009). He argues that Heidegger’s Nazi beliefs, which were so full of vitriol and hate, make him 
evil and his influence should therefore be erased, regardless of the positive consequences it 
might have had on others. It begins to feel as if the author would erase Heidegger altogether if he 
could. Few would argue that Heidegger’s hate was anything but evil. Yet research has 
demonstrated that hate protects us from others we consider evil (Merrick & Beike, 2019). How 
can feeling hate be evil and at the same time protect us from the evil of others?  
The relationship between hate and evil is an exceedingly complex one. The words are 
often used interchangeably and hate and evil are considered to be the same or rooted in the same 
causes (Baumeister 1996; Sternberg, 2003). In our own research, we have demonstrated that hate 
labels what is evil and protects the self from it (Merrick & Beike, 2019), but other researchers 
have demonstrated people avoid feeling hate because they believe it incites evil in the self 
(Halperin, 2008). If hate protects us from evil, how can it be evil to feel hate? This question is 
approached as a scientific inquiry, but it is just as important to understand people’s perceptions 
of this question and of the concepts of hate and evil (James, 1890; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 
1992). It is not only important to empirically explore the relationship between hate and evil, but 
to understand people’s beliefs about hate and evil and how these concepts are perceived to 
function and interact.  
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The Problems with Hate 
Broadly speaking, there are two main problems with the study of hate. The first is that 
hate is an undeniably difficult construct to define. One reason for this difficulty is the 
disagreement surrounding what kind of a construct hate actually is (see Royzman, McCauley, 
and Rozin, 2003 for review). Hate has been described as a discrete emotion (Elster, 1999), 
separable and distinguishable from other negative emotions. It has also been described as a 
complex emotion that is comprised of other emotions, including a combination of anger and fear 
(McCauley, 2002), and a combination of anger, contempt, and disgust (Matsumoto, Hwang, & 
Frank, 2017; Sternberg, 2003). Relatedly, hate has been described as a perversion of other 
negative emotions including disgust (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) and anger (Dozier, 2002; 
Frijda, 1986). Finally, hate has been described as a sentiment, or a negative identification that 
informs emotions but is separate from them (Gervais & Fessler, 2017; Shand, 1920), and an 
emotional attitude akin to extreme dislike (Ben Ze’ev, 1992; Ekman, 1992). As Royzman, 
McCauley, and Rozin (2003) point out, there is no generally accepted definition of hate. 
In a study in which participants were asked to describe the nature of hate, hate was 
typically described as an emotion (Aumer-Ryan & Hatfield, 2007). Similarly, in a study in which 
participants provided characteristics of hate, we found that they described it as being brief, 
frequent, and intense (Merrick & Beike, 2019). In other words, participants characterized hate as 
emotion-like, rather than as a sentiment or emotional attitude. Both of the studies described 
above also demonstrated that hate tends to be associated with other negative emotions, though 
differently. Aumer-Ryan and Hatfield (2007) found that participants described hate as an 
extreme form of other negative emotions including dislike, anger, and disgust. In our study, 
participants reported that their hate co-occurs with other negative emotions including anger and 
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dislike. Notably, these studies differed in their procedure of asking participants about hate. The 
former utilized a qualitative method by having participants describe hate, while the latter 
specifically asked participants which emotions they experienced during an episode in which they 
experienced hate, utilizing a more quantitative methodology. Therefore, it is hard to determine 
whether hate merely co-occurs with other negative emotions or whether it consists of other 
negative emotions. Importantly, with the exception of Merrick and Beike (2019), the theories and 
studies described above do not differentiate between intergroup and interpersonal hate, which 
might account for the discord in the theoretical construct attributed to hate. For the purpose of 
the current study, and based on past research, hate is defined as a negative emotional response to 
a perception that a target is evil or has acted immorally.  
The second broad issue with the study of hate is that, while there are several theoretical 
perspectives explicating it, there has been very little empirical exploration. Within the research 
that does exist on hate, there are two important observations to be made. First, hate is often 
compared with other negative emotions, namely anger and dislike. This body of research 
provides evidence that hate is not just an extreme or perverse manifestation of one of these 
emotions. The comparison of hate to each of these emotions elucidates different characteristics 
of hate. This literature and the subsequent conclusions about hate are discussed in the following 
sections. The second observation about the research on hate is that it is inconsistent in regard to 
its target. Some research focuses on intergroup hate, or hate toward a person or group of people 
based on group membership, while other research focuses on interpersonal hate, or hate toward 
an individual based on character or actions unrelated to group membership. The possible 
importance of this inconsistency and the subsequent conclusions about hate are also discussed.  
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The Dislike Problem: Differentiating Hate and Dislike  
 In determining whether there is a difference in hate and dislike, two important 
dimensions have been identified: difference in degree and difference in kind (Van Bavel, Ray, 
Granot, & Cunningham, 2018). According to Darwin, dislike and hate exist along the same 
spectrum, separated only by intensity, and therefore are only different by degree (Darwin, 1872). 
A similar perspective has been offered more recently, in which hate is argued to be a global 
negative attitude, similar to dislike (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Ben Ze’ev, 2000). This theoretical 
assumption has gone so far as to infiltrate the scientific study of hate. In one study in which 
participants were asked to interpret characters’ emotional reactions in scenarios, hate and dislike 
were part of the same item and treated synonymously (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993).  
A difference of kind suggests that hate and dislike are distinct negative affective states, 
separated by more than just degree of intensity. One suggestion for the difference in hate and 
dislike is the nature of their motivation. Allport (1954) suggested that, similar to dislike, hate is a 
sentiment, but that it is motivated by ethical concerns. In a series of studies, the question of 
whether hate and dislike differ in degree or in kind was addressed by measuring the negativity 
(degree) and morality (kind) of both targets of hate and dislike (Van Bavel et al., 2018). Results 
revealed that hate and dislike differ in both degree and in kind. Specifically, hate is more intense 
and more connected to moral convictions than dislike. Furthermore, when controlling for 
negativity, hated targets are still considered more connected to morals. These results support 
Allport’s (1954) claim that, in order to experience hate, a person must consider the target of their 
hate to have violated something morally valuable to them. To my knowledge, Van Bavel and 
colleagues' manuscript is the first empirical comparison of hate and dislike. This study 
successfully differentiates hate from dislike and indicates that hate is concerned with some moral 
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violation. However, though hate was determined to be more concerned with morals and moral 
convictions, the nature of that moral connection was not explored.  
Another explanation for the differences in hate and dislike, in both degree and in kind, is 
the construct that each represents. As previously mentioned, research has demonstrated that hate 
is experienced as an emotion. There is theoretical evidence that dislike, too, is an emotion 
(Roseman, 1984), though, most research indicates that dislike is an attitude (Collins, 1970; Petty, 
Ostrom, & Brock, 2014; Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977). Attitudes are more permanent 
and less intense toward their object, whereas emotions are brief, intense, and mobilizing (Gervais 
& Fessler, 2017; Roseman, 1984). According to one theory, sentiments, or functional networks 
of affective constructs, link emotions and attitudes in regard to a common object (Gervais & 
Fessler, 2017). For instance, a person might dislike broccoli, which is considered an attitude. 
However, the emotions the person has related to broccoli are likely situational – she might feel 
disgust when broccoli is presented to her, or anger toward a person who tries to serve her 
broccoli. The emotions and attitudes she has that relate to broccoli exist within a network that 
pertain specifically to that object. If hate is an emotion and dislike is an attitude, then it is likely 
hate and dislike differ in degree, as emotions are more intense than attitudes. Hate and dislike 
also likely differ in kind, since they are different constructs, and therefore would be differentially 
related to the moral convictions of the person experiencing them. In the present research, the 
relationship between hate and dislike will be examined more thoroughly.  
The Anger Problem: Differentiating Hate and Anger 
There are two characteristics that are important to address in distinguishing hate and 
anger. The first is the evaluative appraisal that serves as an impetus for hate compared with 
anger. Appraisal theories of emotion assert that emotions are elicited and differentiated from one 
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another based on a person’s subjective evaluation of a situation (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984). 
Appraisals are sufficient, but not necessary to cause emotions (Ellsworth, 2013; Frijda, 1993). 
Theoretical evidence, which often compares hate and anger, suggests that hate is the emotional 
response to evaluations about the character of the target, whereas anger is the emotional response 
to the target’s actions (Allport, 1954; Ben Ze’ev, 1992; Elster, 1999; Fischer et al., 2018;  
Halperin, 2008; Horowitz, 2001). In other words, “hatred says that ‘he is bad,’ anger that ‘he did 
something bad to me’” (Elster, 1999, p. 65).  
In an experimental examination of interpersonal hate compared with anger, when 
participants experienced hate, it was characterized by an attribution that the target and his or her 
actions were evil (Merrick & Beike, 2019). In contrast, while the target of anger may have 
committed some harm against the participant, the act and the target were not considered evil. The 
attribution of evil associated with hate has also been demonstrated in the examination of 
intergroup hate compared with anger (Halperin, 2008). Both hate and anger were associated with 
appraisals that the outgroup had committed an unjust action, but only hate was associated with an 
appraisal that the target was evil. The implication of a character judgment attached to hate but 
not anger suggests that hate serves a purpose that is discrete from that of anger, despite theories 
that suggest that hate is a perversion of anger. 
Another important characteristic that is used to compare hate and anger is the action 
tendency and the motivation for that action tendency. According to appraisal theories, action 
tendencies are responsive actions motivated by emotions (Frijda, 1986; Moors, Ellsworth, 
Scherer, & Frijda, 2013). Though these actions are not always (or even usually) realized, they 
increase the person’s tendency to engage in goal-related actions associated with the emotion-
eliciting event. In general, the action tendency of hate has been described as one of destruction, 
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elimination, or aggression (Elster, 1999; Fischer et al., 2018; Halperin, 2008; Sternberg, 2003;). 
However, other theorists have suggested that the associated action tendency of hate is one of 
avoidance (Beck, 1999; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993).  
In our own research, we explored the action tendency of interpersonal hate and found that 
it was consistently associated with avoidance across five studies, as opposed to anger which was 
characterized by a mixed action tendency of approach and avoidance (Merrick & Beike, 2019). 
In the final study of that set, we also examined the motivation for the action tendency associated 
with hate and anger. For hate, along with the anticipated action tendency of avoidance, there was 
an indication that the avoidance was driven by a desire to protect the self. For anger, the 
motivation of the action tendency was once again mixed. In other words, the experience of hate 
indicates to its host that the target is dangerous, harmful, or destructive. Anger tends to be a more 
flexible emotion that can have either an approach or avoidance action tendency and have a more 
general use. This motivation is further expounded upon by an earlier study, in which 
interpersonal hate and anger were explored in the workplace (Fitness, 2000). When participants 
reported that they experienced hate during anger-eliciting events, the presence of hate was 
negatively related to the perception that the incident had been resolved. In another study 
exploring interpersonal hate, Fitness and Fletcher (1993) found that, when feeling anger toward a 
spouse, participants tended to approach but when they felt hate they tended to avoid the spouse. 
These findings suggest that anger is constructive and motivates its subject to preserve or mend 
the relationship. Hate is destructive and motivated to avoid or eliminate the relationship. This 
was also found in a comparison of intergroup hate and anger (Halperin, 2008). Though the action 
tendency of intergroup hate was more mixed than we found in an examination of interpersonal 
hate, the motivation for the action tendency of intergroup hate was still associated with the 
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perception that there was no opportunity to change the relationship. Together, this research 
suggests that hate is concerned with the destruction of a relationship that has become harmful to 
the self.  
Combining this comparison of the action tendency of hate and anger with the comparison 
of the appraisals that accompany hate, and anger and the comparison of hate and dislike, a more 
complete model takes form. Hate and dislike are differentiated, not just by intensity but by the 
intertwinement of hate with some moral conviction (Van Bavel et al., 2018). In both 
interpersonal hate and anger, the target is perceived to have committed some personal harm or 
injustice toward the subject. However, in anger, though the offense may be exactly the same, the 
attribution differs. In anger, the offense does not lead the complete destruction of the 
relationship. The target is perceived to have done something bad, but is not perceived to be a bad 
person, and so the motivation for any action tendency is to preserve the relationship. In 
interpersonal hate, the harm or injustice does not just hurt the subject, it is assumed to reveal 
something inherently evil about the target. Only a bad person could do what this person did. In 
this case, the motivation for the action tendency is to protect the self, even at the expense of the 
relationship. Though this is a profound revelation, it unfortunately does not completely 
illuminate hate. To do that, it is also necessary to understand evil. 
The Evil Problem: What is Evil? 
The function of hate is to reveal to us what is evil and to help us avoid it. Arguably, hate 
either reveals to us the evil in others, the evil in ourselves, or both. What is clear is that hate and 
evil are inextricably linked. Hate reveals to us the evil in ourselves and others – but what is evil? 
Like hate, evil is an exceptionally fuzzy term that is often used without much consideration for 
its precise meaning. Like hate, there is no generally accepted definition of evil. For instance, in 
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defining hate, the target is often defined as evil without evil ever being expressly defined itself 
(Baumeister & Butz, 2005; Opotow, 2004). In theoretical work on hate, the presence of evil 
implies that a person is dangerous (Ben Ze’ev, 2000), or “intrinsically and irremediably bad” 
(Elster, 1999, p. 65). These characteristic terms do little to describe evil, though, as “bad” and 
“dangerous” are themselves fuzzy and in neither case are they quantifiably measured. A further 
complication arises from the application of the word “evil” to people, actions, motivations, and 
organizations (Singer, 2004). This general application of the word extends the difficulty that 
arises in trying to define it.   
Besides being a generously applied term, evil has been explored across disciplines and 
perspectives, including social psychology, personality psychology, religious studies, and 
philosophy, which collectively provide different ideas about the nature of evil. For instance, 
having been born from a pursuit to understand the atrocities of World War II, social psychology 
has provided perhaps the most theories of evil. There are variations within them, but these 
theories all share a common theme: evil is not a disposition, it is a product of the situation or the 
influence of an organization. In other words, people are not evil; the situation makes people act 
in evil ways.  
In contrast, philosophers and personality psychologists have suggested a dispositional 
perspective of evil. Dispositional perspectives assert that it is not the situation but the person’s 
character that is evil. As discussed previously, it has been demonstrated that people attribute evil 
to the target of their hatred (Halperin, 2008; Merrick & Beike, 2019). Taking an extreme view of 
the dispositional nature of evil, Kant proposed that evil was not an individual difference but an 
innate proclivity of all people toward evil (Kant, 1785). Personality psychologists take a slightly 
less gloomy view, considering evil to be a combination of personality traits. Specifically, the 
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Dark Tetrad (previously the Dark Triad) is proposed as the basis of human evil (Book, Visser, & 
Volk, 2014; Book et al., 2016; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). The Dark Tetrad includes 
Machiavellianism (i.e., calculated manipulation), psychopathy (i.e., lack of empathy and 
increased predatory behavior), narcissism (i.e., grandiosity and excessive importance of the self), 
and sadism (i.e., enjoyment in harming others). Though the situationist and dispositional 
perspectives of evil differ, together they offer three main dimensions that people use to 
categorize others as evil including intentionality, responsibility, and immorality.  
Intentionality. Both situationist and dispositional perspectives of evil indicate that one 
characteristic of evil is that it is intentional. Intentionality refers to the motivation of the target 
who commits evil. Put simply, the person has done something on purpose. According to a widely 
cited definition of evil from the situationist perspective, evil is “intentionally behaving – or 
causing others to act – in ways that demean, dehumanize, destroy, or kill innocent people” 
(Zimbardo, 2004, p. 4). In other words, though the person may be influenced by situational 
factors, their behavior is purposeful. For example, if one person accidentally kills another, then it 
is not considered evil. On the other hand, if a person intentionally murders another, then it is 
considered evil.  
According to the dispositional model of evil, the person who is “evil” (someone who is 
high in the Dark Tetrad constellation of personality traits: narcissism, psychopathy, 
Machiavellianism, and sadism) intentionally causes harm to others, either out of pleasure or 
disregard for the welfare of others (Furham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013). Both perspectives 
support the idea that, regardless of whether it is because the person is evil or because of the 
situation, the person is motivated to commit immoral acts.  
11 
 
Responsibility. A second dimension by which evil is considered through is the 
responsibility of the agent. Responsibility refers to whether or not the target made a rational 
choice in perpetrating the immoral acts, or in other words, the target should be held accountable 
for his or her actions. From the situationist perspective, the target must be aware of the 
consequences of their actions (Zimbardo, 2004). For instance, one suggestion is to consider the 
criteria by which we incarcerate those who have committed crimes (Darley, 1992). We consider 
whether the person was responsible for their actions by considering whether they could fathom 
the consequences for those actions and whether they had a choice in their actions. We also 
consider whether the person acted under duress. Referring to the previous example of intentional 
and unintentional murder, if a woman intentionally kills her husband, but the husband in question 
had systematically abused and terrorized the woman, then she may or may not be considered 
responsible for her actions, and therefore her actions might not be considered evil. This is not to 
say her actions are considered moral. Acts can be immoral without being evil. Evil entails both 
intentionality and responsibility.   
The dimension of responsibility is also debated from the dispositional perspective. Moral 
development and the Dark Triad of traits have been linked to environmental rather genetic 
factors (Campbell, 2009). Additionally, a longitudinal study demonstrated that harsh and 
unpredictable environments in adolescence have downstream negative behavioral effects in early 
adulthood (Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis, 2010). The central question of this perspective is this: 
is the person still considered evil who has been nurtured into evil ways? For instance, a literary 
example of this question exists in the examination of Heathcliff in Wuthering Heights (Brontë, 
1847). Initially, he is considered both responsible and intentional in his actions and the resulting 
evaluation leaves little doubt of his evil character. The reader then spends the rest of the novel 
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learning about Heathcliff’s life story and the question of Heathcliff’s responsibility for his evil 
character looms heavy throughout. Ultimately, it is not as important to discern what is or is not 
evil character, but to determine people’s interpretations and evaluations of character. In other 
words, if people are not stopping to consider the backstory of the evil person, then they no doubt 
hold them responsible for their actions. Both responsibility and intentionality are hypothesized as 
necessary criteria for people’s perceptions of evil. A person must choose to act and be motivated 
to act immorally to be considered evil.  
Responsibility differs from intentionality in that a person might act intentionally but be in 
an altered state of mind or under duress. For example, if a woman is kidnapped and a bomb is 
forcibly strapped to her chest and she is told it will detonate and kill herself and others if she 
refuses to follow her kidnapers’ instructions, she might intentionally follow their orders even if 
they caused harm to another person, but not be held responsible for her actions. Alternately, 
responsibility might also be present in the absence of intentionality. If a driver strikes and kills a 
pedestrian with his car but is texting and thus not paying sufficient attention to driving 
conditions, he may not have intentionally killed the pedestrian, but he would still be held 
responsible for his actions. Weiner (1993) argued that responsibility and intentionality are 
closely related but that responsibility is subject to judgments about moral justification whereas 
intentionality is not. In other words, an act can be intentional or unintentional, but the person 
who committed the act cannot be deemed responsible until the circumstances of the person are 
known. An additional difference, he argued, is that intentionality is a causal property and tells us 
about how the person carried out their actions, whereas responsibility is an inference we make 
about the person’s character.  
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Immorality. In the study of evil, there has been some disagreement about the nature of 
the acts that must be perpetrated in order to be considered evil, but there is consensus in the 
assumption that some sort of immorality underlies evil. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) argues 
that evil can exist based on a violation of any of the foundations of morality (Graham & Haidt, 
2012). According to MFT, there are six moral foundations that make up people’s moral systems 
based on which of the foundations they value (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 
2004). According to MFT, evil is “anything that stands in the way of sacredness” (Graham & 
Haidt, 2012, p. 6). In contrast, the situationist perspective defines evil as intentional acts of 
personal harm, or lack of care, therefore violating the harm/care foundation (Baumeister, 1996; 
Staub, 1999; Zimbardo, 2004). What is clear from the research on evil is that it includes 
immorality. However, as argued earlier, an act can be immoral without being evil. It is 
hypothesized here that immorality is necessary but not sufficient for evil. Rather, it is immorality 
that is intentional and for which the agent is responsible.  
Evil Conclusions. In the study of hate, the nature of evil is of secondary interest to 
people’s beliefs about evil. If the same acts can instigate both anger and hate, but the 
determination of evil distinguishes one from the other, then it is important to understand how 
people define evil. It is not important that the target of hate is actually evil –this analysis is not 
intended as a way of determining what is truly good and truly evil. The central question of 
interest in the present research is, what do people believe about evil and what criteria they are 
using to make that determination? This is a distinction that is often made between scientific 
inquiry and folk psychology and it is particularly important to the current research (Johnson-
Laird & Oatley, 1992). Though the two are often pitted against one another, this is unnecessary 
as one informs the other. Specifically, regarding evil, people are thought to have an intuition of 
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what is evil to help them avoid evil people (Darley, 1992). Using both the situationist and 
dispositional perspectives of evil, the dimensions that people use to evaluate evil are identified as 
intentionality, responsibility, and perception of immorality.  
In the research on hate, one place where the problem of evil is particularly pronounced is 
in the differentiation of intergroup and interpersonal hate. The role of evil in these two constructs 
is explored and suggested as a possible component on which they differ. Specifically, the role of 
evil in both interpersonal and intergroup hate is explored, and may shed light on the original 
research question posited here, “if hate protects us from evil, how can it be evil to feel hate?” 
The Two Hates Problem 
In contemplating the relationship between hate and evil, it seems as if there are two 
different types of hate or at least two different outcomes of hate. The first protects the self from 
evil and the second causes evil. However, it is unclear if there is a specific distinction that 
differentiates the two kinds. In the following sections, the theoretical evidence for different types 
of hate are considered.  
Interpersonal versus intergroup hate. Hate serves as a potent example of the difference 
in intergroup and interpersonal emotions. While intergroup and interpersonal emotions differ 
from one another (Smith & Mackie, 2015), most publications describing hate invariably lead 
with a hook about Nazis, Rwanda, or other examples of genocide and hate crimes - horrible 
atrocities that are no doubt deserving phenomena of our attention and study, but that clearly 
describe intergroup hate (Allport, 1954; Gaylin, 2003; Staub, 1999; Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, 
2005). Furthermore, most empirical evidence has focused on intergroup hate (Halperin, 2008; 
Halperin, 2012; Pearson, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2007). It has even been suggested that hate almost 
exclusively occurs toward groups, not individuals (Gaylin, 2003). But what about the 
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phenomenon of interpersonal hate, the experience when one person hates another person, not for 
the group they represent, but for who they are as an individual or what they have done? This 
phenomenon seems inherently different than intergroup hate. In fact, they seem to demonstrate 
very different experiences that are covered under the same word. Yet the research on hate very 
rarely distinguishes them from one another.  
Duplex theory of hate. According to the duplex theory of hate, hate is comprised of 
three components (Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, 2005). The first is the negation of intimacy, or 
repulsion and disgust felt toward the target of hate. The second is passion, or the intensity that 
characterizes hate in the form of anger and fear. The third component is commitment, or a 
cognitive devaluation or dehumanization of the target that manifests as contempt. This theory 
does not attempt to address the difference in the experiences of intergroup and interpersonal hate, 
supposing them to be the same, or, more likely, supposing that any differences aren’t important 
to the underlying components.  
Another interesting proposal of the duplex theory of hate is that hate incites evil within 
the self (Sternberg, 2003). The theory argues that hate is the basis of acts of genocide, terrorism, 
and massacres, and therefore is the basis for human evil. It is further suggested that the roots of 
evil might collectively form the basis for hate (Baumeister, 1996; Sternberg, 2003). Though the 
duplex theory of hate proposes that intergroup and interpersonal hate do not differ on this 
incitation of evil, this idea has not been empirically tested.  
Rational and irrational hate. Another theory offers a possible dimension by which 
interpersonal and intergroup hate might be distinguished. Fromm (1973) proffered that there are 
two kinds of hate: rational and irrational. Hate toward a target in response to personal harm or 
injustice is considered rational hate. This hate leads to aggression, but with the underlying 
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function of preserving what is right. In other words, the aggression is justified because it defends 
the person’s life or freedom, as well as promoting the social order by punishing the target.  
Hate toward a target because of their race, religion, or group membership, etc., is 
irrational hate. This irrational or character-conditioned hate is considered to be the basis of 
prejudice, and is based on idealism (Baumeister and Butz, 2005). Irrational hate is not a response 
to a specific action but is a demonstration of the subject’s (rather than the target’s) character. 
This hate is unjustified, poisonous, and involves dehumanization of the target. It does not benefit 
the self and serves to weaken or destroy social order.  
The presence of dehumanization is one of two important points that reflect back to the 
duplex theory of hate. First, dehumanization is a central tenet of the commitment component of 
hate (Sternberg, 2005). Irrational hate is based in an ideology in which the target is hated for the 
characteristics of a group, rather than for his or her own actions (Baumeister & Butz, 2005; 
Staub, 1999). It is possible that this component is the crux of the difference in interpersonal and 
intergroup hate and even rational and irrational hate. The ability or willingness to dehumanize 
others would certainly seem to weaken or destroy social order and would not reflect positively 
on the subject. Secondly, this type of hate is referred to as “character-conditioned,” and refers to 
the propensity of the person to experience hate toward others based on group membership as an 
innate part of their character. While the duplex theory of hate suggests that all hate can incite evil 
in the self and therefore all people have it within them to enact evil if it is activated, this theory 
suggests that some people have hate within their character and the capacity for evil stems from 
this.  
One interpretation of these theories might suggest that the distinction in rational and 
irrational hate seems to describe the observed differences in intergroup and interpersonal hate. 
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Rational hate occurs in response to a personal harm, whereas irrational hate is directed toward 
groups and group members. Ergo, it suggests that interpersonal hate tends to be rational, whereas 
intergroup hate tends to be irrational. There are almost certainly exceptions to this statement, but 
this theory elucidates an important difference. Whatever the distinction, whether intergroup and 
interpersonal, rational and irrational, or both, there seem to be two different kinds of hate: hate 
that provides information about the nature of the target of hate and hate that provides information 
about the character of the person who experiences hate. Importantly, the nature of the 
information provided by both hates might be the same. The difference is whether the information 
reveals something about the subject or the target of the hate. The nature of this information is 
explored in the function that hate serves.  
Furthermore, the subjective feeling of hate may not differ. It is possible that they share 
the components outlined in the duplex theory of hate (Sternberg, 2003). However, it seems that 
the knowledge about the justification for the emotion underlying each type of hate differs. One 
hate is internally justified. The subject feels that the hate is necessary in order to protect the self 
or protect social order. The other hate is not justified. While the subject may feel justified, he or 
she is not validated in their hate. They are motivated to tear down others for the sake of 
destruction of the group and of social order.  
Intergroup vs. Interpersonal Hate: A Morality Issue?  
As hate takes shape as an emotion that is characterized by the revelation of evil in the 
target and a desire to avoid that target to protect the self and uphold social order, it begins to take 
on the characteristics of a moral emotion. Moral emotions have been differentiated from 
nonmoral emotions through several theories (Gray & Wegner, 2011; Haidt, 2003). One theory of 
moral emotions posits that moral emotions exist along two dimensions: valence, or the presence 
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of either help or harm, and moral type, or the extent to which the target is an agent or a patient 
(Gray & Wegner, 2011). According to this theory, moral emotions are elicited by moral events 
that are observed. These moral events exist within the moral domain, which is determined by a 
person’s moral values (Graham et al., 2011). Additionally, moral emotions have agents, who are 
responsible for the help or harm, and patients, who receive the help or harm.  
A second theory of moral emotions incorporates a self/other distinction in which the 
person can be an actor in the moral event that elicits the emotion. It is this distinction that most 
directly applies to interpersonal hate. According to this theory, moral emotions uphold social 
order through prosocial action tendencies, and are motivated by a desire to benefit others (Haidt, 
2003). Though the self may indirectly benefit from the consequences of such emotions, the main 
recipient is humanity as a whole, or at least someone outside of the self. This theory claims that 
there are families of moral emotions that either focus on the self or focus on others. For instance, 
self-conscious emotions, including shame, embarrassment, guilt, and pride, are meant to monitor 
behavior in the self (Lewis, 1993; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).  
The emotion family of most interest to the current research is the other-condemning 
emotion family, including contempt, anger and disgust. Also called the CAD triad of moral 
emotions, these emotions monitor the behavior of others (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). 
Specifically, the CAD triad (contempt, anger, and disgust) monitor violations of Shweder’s “Big 
Three” moral codes (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). According to the CAD model, 
anger is elicited in response to violations of personal harm, contempt to violations of an ingroup, 
and disgust in response to purity or global normative standards. As previously discussed, the 
duplex theory of hate claims that these very moral violations and emotions are the basis of all 
hate (Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, 2005). However, as the duplex theory of hate primarily 
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concerns intergroup hate, it does not propose that the action tendencies associated with hate are 
prosocial. If we return to the theory of rational and irrational hate, though, we find that rational 
hate is concerned with upholding social order. Interpersonal hate, which maps onto rational hate, 
informs the subject of the evil character and actions of others, and motivates an action tendency 
of avoidance. In the case of disgust, one of the other-condemning emotions, the action tendency 
is also avoidance (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). In the case of disgust, avoidance is 
considered to be prosocial behavior because it ostracizes the target, which removes him or her 
(and his or her influence) from society. This may also be the case for interpersonal hate. If the 
target is evil, then he or she is avoided to protect the self and to uphold social order. In other 
words, interpersonal hate seems to fit snugly within the confines of the other-condemning moral 
emotions. It is not argued that the same is true for intergroup hate, and the distinction of morality 
seems to widen the chasm between.  
Unlike interpersonal hate, intergroup hate is predicted to precipitate an approach action 
tendency. In the case of the duplex theory of hate this is even more exaggerated, as the theory is 
concerned primarily with extreme aggressive acts including genocide, massacre, and terrorism – 
(Sternberg, 2003). Additionally, the duplex theory of hate asserts that hate is the basis of human 
evil. This suggests that hate not only monitors the evil of others, but also incites evil within the 
self. An empirical examination of the duplex theory of hate demonstrates this complexity, though 
somewhat unintentionally. Examining White Americans’ treatment of Black Americans and the 
role of hate in the U.S. legal system, one study found that hate occurred across the several 
dimensions but defined evil specifically as dehumanization and an attribution of the group’s 
character (Pearson, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2007). When hate was accompanied by this evil, it 
significantly predicted people’s support of the death penalty. In other words, hate was incited by 
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a determination about the evil character of the target and in feeling hate the subject condoned 
violence toward the target. This seems to suggest a sort of “moral exclusion,” such that moral 
standards that apply to all people are used to determine hate toward a target, but no longer apply 
to their own behavior toward the target (Opotow, 1990).  
To date, the relationship between hate and evil, in which experiencing hate incites evil 
within the self, has not been explored specifically in interpersonal hate, and there are reasons to 
think interpersonal hate and intergroup hate differ along this dimension. For instance, while 
massacre, terrorism, and genocide are explicit acts of violence, an approach action tendency in 
the extreme, interpersonal hate is characterized by avoidance and self-protection. Such an action 
tendency does not seem to be the embodiment of evil, as is the argument for intergroup hate. We 
know from previous research that both interpersonal and intergroup hate involve an attribution 
that the target is evil. We know also that intergroup hate provokes evil in the self. The question 
then becomes: does interpersonal hate provoke evil in the self? Evidence says that it should not – 
avoidance is not evil. However, if people do not differentiate the consequences of interpersonal 
hate from intergroup hate, this might not be the case. People may assume that feeling hate 
exposes the self to evil, regardless of the target or action tendency. To fully examine this, it is 
important to address several points. First, it is important to define evil, and to examine people’s 
beliefs about evil. More specifically, it is important to determine what people perceive about the 
relationship between evil and the self, and how the relationship between evil and the self relates 
to their perceptions and experiences of hate. Finally, it is important to determine whether people 
are making distinctions between the consequences to the self of interpersonal and intergroup 
hate. Do people perceive all hate as irrational, even when the hate is justified? 
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Statement of the Problem 
 There are many challenges that arise in the study of hate and evil. One of the most 
formidable is that both terms are ambiguous and often used without being operationally defined. 
Research conducted in recent years has done much to supplement our empirical knowledge about 
the determinants of hate. Hate has been characterized by an attribution of evil about the target 
(Halperin, 2008; Merrick & Beike, 2019). Though people have indicated that hate informs them 
about the evil in others, it is not yet understood what criteria people use to determine what is evil. 
In the current research, three dimensions were identified along which perceptions about evil were 
explored: intentionality, responsibility, and immorality. Hypothesis 1 is that evil is recognized in 
immoral acts that are intentional and in which the offending person is responsible for his or her 
actions. This hypothesis was explored in both Studies 1 and 2, with Study 1 utilizing third-person 
vignettes portraying immoral acts, and Study 2 utilizing participants’ own experiences. In Study 
1, intentionality and responsibility were manipulated and participants rated the amount of evil 
they perceived. In Study 2, participants were asked to relay experiences from their own lives (or 
the life of someone they knew) and asked to indicate the amount of evil, intentionality, and 
responsibility they perceived in the offending target. Though participants were asked to provide 
their beliefs about the nature of evil (i.e. whether it is situational or dispositional or other), this 
question was exploratory and no specific predictions were offered about this measure. It is 
important to note that there are no hypotheses related to moral foundation violations. Because 
each moral foundation violation was only represented by one story, any effect of violation is 
confounded with story effects. Therefore, though violations are included in subsequent analyses, 
they will not be discussed in terms of the hypotheses like the other variables will.  
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A second challenge with the study of hate and evil is understanding the terms of their 
relationship to one another and whether the same dimensions (responsibility, intentionality, and 
immorality) are important to both. One way to understand the relationship between hate and evil 
is to compare it to the relationship between evil and another negative emotion. Recently, we 
compared the relationship between hate and evil to the relationship between anger and evil. We 
discovered that hate, but not anger, involves an attribution of evil (Merrick & Beike, 2019). 
Other researchers have compared the relationship between hate and immorality to that of dislike 
and immorality, and discovered that hate, but not dislike, involves an attribution of immorality 
(Van Bavel et al., 2018). Because this second study did not look at the relationship between hate 
and dislike with evil specifically (using the term immoral rather than evil), dislike was chosen as 
the emotion for comparison to hate for the current studies. Van Bavel et al., (2018) demonstrated 
that hate and dislike differ in degree or intensity and in kind. Therefore, these dimensions were 
used to compare hate and dislike in the present research.  
Hypothesis 2 is that hate and dislike differ in degree. This was tested in both Studies 1 
and 2, and in two different ways. In previous research we found that participants did not report 
intense feelings of hate for third-person scenarios but reported much stronger hate when 
recounting their own experiences. H2, therefore, is that in Study 1 (in which third-person stories 
are used), anticipated feelings of dislike will be more intense than anticipated feelings of hate, 
and in Study 2 (in which personal experiences are used), feelings of hate will be more intense 
than feelings of dislike. Additionally, in Study 2 hate and dislike were manipulated as 
independent variables. Since it was hypothesized that hate and dislike differ in degree, then 
support for H2 was predicted to manifest in the form of main effects of emotion (hate and 
dislike). Specifically, it was predicted that hate would be considered worse than dislike overall.   
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Hypothesis 3 is that hate and dislike differ in kind. Support for H3 was predicted to 
include results that indicated that hate and dislike have differential relationships with evil in both 
Studies 1 and 2, and by interactions with other variables (subject and target) in Study 2. It was 
specifically predicted that hate has a stronger relationship with evil than dislike, and that hate 
differs from dislike, not only in intensity but in the combination of subject, target, and emotional 
activation (in the form of hate and dislike intensity as outcome variables) it affects.  
Another challenge in the study of hate is determining whether people actually use the 
distinctions that have been outlined here to differentiate different types of hate. While one type 
of hate is characterized by a tendency to avoid that is motivated by a desire to protect the self, the 
other type of hate is characterized by a tendency to attack and has been theorized to activate evil 
within the self. There is evidence, then, that hate not only monitors the evil in others, but incites 
evil within the subject who feels it. However, it is unclear whether people are making this 
distinction between different types of hate and what those distinctions are.  
To address the hypotheses related to differentiating hate, the data for participants who 
completed measures about hate in Study 2 were isolated and analyzed without the data for people 
who answered questions about dislike. It should be noted that these analyses were not originally 
outlined in the data analysis plan for Study 2, but it was the intention of this Study 2 determine 
whether different kinds of hate arise when the subject and target of hate is manipulated. Though 
the analyses were not originally planned, the hypotheses relating to hate were outlined before the 
data was collected.   
Hypothesis 4 is that there are distinct types of hate. There are three sub-hypotheses that 
outline potential dimensions by which these types of hate might be differentiated that were tested 
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in Study 2. These dimensions include whether the target of hate is a group or an individual and 
whether the person experiencing the emotion is the self or someone else.  
 H4(a) is that hate toward groups will indicate more evil within the subject (self or other) 
than hate toward individuals, particularly when others experience it (relative to the self). This 
hypothesis reflects the duplex theory of hate’s theoretical assertion that hate incites evil within 
the self, which occurs most strongly toward groups (Sternberg, 2003). In other words, when 
others hate groups, they are perceived to be acting on prejudice, and therefore their emotions are 
less justified.   
H4(b) is that others’ hate is worse than the self’s hate. Specifically, others’ hate indicates 
more activation of evil and is more wrong than hate experienced by the self. In other words, 
people are more willing to justify their own emotions than the emotions of others. Though this 
may be a reflection of an attribution bias (e.g., I hate someone because they are a bad person, but 
you hate them because you are),  it is important in determining the severity of the consequences 
of hate for both the self and others (Jones & Nisbett, 1987). 
H4(c) concerns perceptions about the person toward whom the hate is felt. H4(c) is that 
the target will be considered more evil when they have offended the self relative to a target who 
has offended someone else. Once again, this may reflect the self-serving bias, in that what 
happens to the self is worse than what happens to someone else. Therefore, the offending target 
of the self’s emotions must be worse than the target of someone else’s emotions.  
Whether or not people make distinctions in types of hate is a particularly important issue. 
If people do not make this distinction, then by avoiding the harmful consequences of one type of 
hate people might be missing the protective consequences of the other. To measure the impact of 
these different dimensions, participants provided feedback about the evil of the target, the evil of 
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the subject for feeling a negative emotion toward the target, and how ardently the subject resisted 
feeling the emotion.  
The hypotheses are reiterated below:  
Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis 1 is that responsibility and intentionality are both necessary for 
evil to be recognized in another person, but neither is sufficient on its own. 
Hypothesis 2: Hate and dislike differ in degree, and feelings of hate are less intense than 
dislike in response to third-person stories, but feelings of hate and dislike are both more intense 
in response to hate experiences than dislike experiences. 
 Hypothesis 3: Hate and dislike differ in kind. Specifically, hate has a stronger 
relationship with evil and is overall more immoral than dislike.  
Hypothesis 4: There are distinct types of hate.  
Hypothesis 4a: Hate toward groups indicates more evil within the subject (self or 
other) than hate toward individuals, particularly when others experience it 
(relative to the self).  
Hypothesis 4b: Others’ hate is morally worse than the self’s hate. 
Hypothesis 4c: The target will be considered more evil when they have offended 
the self relative to a target who has offended someone else.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. Sample size for Study 1 was predetermined based on a similar previous 
study to be 400 participants, or 100 participants per cell (Merrick & Beike, 2019). Participants 
included 273 University of Arkansas students, who completed the online survey through 
Qualtrics in exchange for partial fulfillment of a research requirement; and 127 Mechanical Turk 
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workers, recruited through TurkPrime and compensated one dollar and fifty cents for their 
participation based on a ten-dollar hourly rate. The sample included 197 female, 200 male, one 
who indicated other, and 12 who chose not to answer. They ranged in age from 18 to 67 with a 
mean age of 26.14. Eighty nine percent of participants were White, 5% were Black, 4% were 
Asian, 5% were Latinx, 1% were Native American, 1% were Pacific Islander, and 1% indicated 
other. Participants could choose more than one ethnicity. Per the data analysis plan, any 
participants who missed more than four comprehension check questions would be excluded. 
However, after data collection it was discovered that more than two-thirds of the sample should 
be excluded based on this criterion. Furthermore, closer inspection revealed that all but ten 
participants (out of 201) in the Not Responsible conditions were excluded under the criterion, 
and there were no other differences in gender, race, or age between the participants that were to 
be included and those that were to be excluded. It was therefore obvious that participants in the 
Not Responsible condition had either misunderstood the information in the vignettes, that the 
vignettes themselves were not successfully manipulated in this condition, or that participants did 
not understand the questions. Further analyses (presented in the Results and Discussion section) 
revealed a failure to manipulate responsibility in the vignettes, or at least failure of participants to 
understand what was asked of them in the comprehension and manipulation check questions. 
Because such a large portion of the sample was excluded, the data analyses were conducted in 
two ways: with only the participants who met the original inclusion criteria, and with all 
participants included. The results of the analyses with all of the participants were presented in the 
text. The results of the diminished sample are available in Appendix A1.  
                                                 
1 The only differences in the results of Study 1 with and without the excluded participants were effects of 
responsibility that occurred in the larger sample. Those effects were expectedly absent from the smaller dataset, as 
almost all of the participants in the Not Responsible condition were not included.  
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Procedure. Study 1 was conducted online. Participants first completed an informed 
consent which was recorded on a separate survey from the rest of their responses to preserve 
anonymity. Participants read six short vignettes and respond to questions corresponding to each. 
Study 1 employed a 2 (responsible, not responsible)  2 (intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral 
foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, liberty) mixed model design, with 
responsibility and intentionality presented between subjects and the moral foundations presented 
within subjects. After completing the informed consent, participants were assigned to one of four 
conditions in which the actions of the character in the vignette varied in intentionality and 
responsibility. These groups included responsible and intentional, responsible but unintentional, 
not responsible but intentional, and not responsible and unintentional (see Appendix B for the 
materials for Study 1). Within each condition, participants read vignettes portraying each of the 
moral foundations. All of the characters were male to prevent any gender differences in 
participants’ perceptions. Presentation order of the vignettes was randomized for each participant 
to prevent order effects.   
 Each vignette included one named character (hereafter referred to as the Focal Character) 
and one unnamed character that was an acquaintance of the Focal Character (hereafter referred to 
as the Associate). In each vignette, the Associate encouraged the Focal Character to commit a 
moral violation. The Focal Character was the main character of the story. The actions of the 
Focal Character were manipulated in intentionality and responsibility, constituting the four 
conditions described above. Each vignette ended with statements about the responsibility and 
intentionality of the actions of the Focal Character to minimize participant confusion and to 
ensure the manipulation was obvious.  
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 After each vignette, participants answered two true/false questions that served as 
comprehension checks. These included two statements about the intentionality and responsibility 
of the Focal Character and reflected the two final statements of the vignette which the 
participants had to indicate as either true or false. Participants were excluded if they missed more 
than four of these questions across all of the comprehension questions. For each vignette, 
participants then completed a short survey in which they indicated their agreement with several 
statements using a seven-point scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 (very strongly agree). 
The first set of statements concerned participants perceptions about the Focal Character 
beginning with intentionality and responsibility (e.g. “Tom acted on purpose;” “Tom is 
responsible for his actions.”). These statements were similar to the attention check questions, but 
rather than checking participants’ comprehension of the vignettes, these questions were intended 
to measure participants’ beliefs about the intentionality and responsibility of the Focal 
Character’s actions and were prefaced by asking participants to what extent they believed these 
statements to be accurate. Next, participants indicated their agreement with statements that the 
Associate and the Focal Character were evil (e.g. “Tom is evil;” “Tom’s friend is evil.”), once 
again using a seven-point scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 (very strongly agree). The 
item about the evil of the Associate was intended to mask the focus of the study and was not 
analyzed.  
Following these statements, participants answered questions regarding their own 
hypothetical emotions had they been the victims/observers in the scenario described in the 
vignette on a scale from 1 (none at all) to 7 (a great deal). Once again, there were questions 
about both characters but only the questions regarding the Focal Character were of interest. 
Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the amount of hate and dislike they would feel 
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for both characters had they been victims of their actions (in vignettes that included victims) or 
observers of their actions (in vignettes that did not include victims). For instance, in the case of 
harm violations, the question was “If you were the victim of this situation, how much 
hate/dislike would you feel toward [Focal Character]?” In the case of purity violations (which 
were less likely to have victims) an example item was “If you saw this happen, how much 
hate/dislike would you feel toward [Focal Character]?” These items were designed to capture the 
relationship between perceived evil/immorality and the emotions of hate and dislike by 
measuring participants’ anticipated hate or dislike if they were in the situation. To clarify this, in 
the Results section the hate and dislike analyses are referred to as “anticipated hate/dislike.”  
Finally, for each vignette participants were asked to provide their own perspective of the 
Focal Character’s morality in a series of agreement statements on a scale from 1 (very strongly 
disagree) to 7 (very strongly agree), including items such as “[Focal Character] is infected by 
[Associate]’s immorality” and “[Focal Character] chose to act immorally.” These items served to 
indicate participants’ beliefs about the contagion or activation of evil in the Focal Character after 
he had been exposed to the moral violations (immorality) of the Associate. These questions were 
not included in the analyses of the present research.  
After participants responded to all six vignettes, they completed several personality and 
beliefs measures. These measures were not included in the analyses of this study but will be 
analyzed at a later time. These measures included the Moral Vitalism Scale (Bastian et al., 2015), 
the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham & Haidt, 2011), items regarding beliefs about 
evil, and items about consequences for bad people. Finally, participants completed demographic 
measures and were debriefed.  
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Data Analysis Plan 
Any participants who missed more than four of the comprehension check questions were 
planned to be excluded from the analysis. All remaining participants were to be included. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were addressed in Study 1. The analysis plan is discussed in terms of the 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1 is that responsibility and intentionality are both necessary for evil to be 
recognized, but neither is sufficient on its own. A 2 (responsible, not responsible)  2 
(intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, 
liberty) mixed model analysis of variance was conducted on the item measuring the perceived 
evil of the Focal Character (whose actions were manipulated). Based on H1, it was predicted that 
the analysis would reveal an interaction between responsibility and intentionality of the Focal 
Character. Specifically, it was predicted that a post-hoc simple effects test would reveal that 
Focal Characters in vignettes that displayed both intentionality and responsibility would be 
considered significantly more evil than vignettes with any other combination of responsibility 
and intentionality. Because H1 predicted that both intentionality and responsibility were 
necessary for the recognition of evil, the main effects of intentionality and responsibility were 
not considered important. However, it was considered likely that two main effects would emerge 
from this analysis. First was a main effect of responsibility is likely, such that the Focal 
Character’s actions would be perceived as more evil when the character was directly responsible 
for his actions. The second was a main effect of intentionality, such that the Focal Character’s 
actions would be perceived as more evil when they were intentional. No main effect was 
predicted for moral foundation, based on MFT’s suggestion that evil exists at all levels of moral 
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foundations (Graham & Haidt, 2014). However, as mentioned previously any effects of violation 
might also be attributed to story effects and therefore were not reported in the main text. 
An additional analysis to explore H1 consisted of computing participants’ average scores 
of intentionality of the Focal Characters’ actions, responsibility for the Focal Characters’ actions, 
and perceived evil of the Focal Characters across all vignettes, and then conducting a 
simultaneous regression in which participants’ intentionality and responsibility ratings of each 
vignette were entered as predictors of evil. It was hypothesized that intentionality and 
responsibility would independently predict participants’ perceptions of evil of the Focal 
Character.  
Hypothesis 2 is that hate and dislike differ in degree. H2 and partially H3, that hate and 
dislike differ in kind, were explored through the same analysis. A 2 (responsible, not 
responsible)  2 (intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, 
authority, purity, liberty) x 2 (emotion type: anticipated hate, anticipated dislike) mixed model 
analysis of variance was conducted on anticipated emotion. Support for H2 would include a main 
effect of emotion, such that anticipated feelings of dislike would be more intense than anticipated 
feelings of hate. Regarding H3, a two-way interaction of emotion and responsibility was 
expected, in which hate, but not dislike increased when the Focal Character was responsible, 
compared to when he was not responsible. A similar two-way was predicted between emotion 
and intentionality, in which hate, but not dislike, increased when the Focal Character’s actions 
were intentional, compared to when they were unintentional.  
Support for H3 was also explored through a simultaneous regression. Average anticipated 
hate and average anticipated dislike scores were computed and entered as simultaneous 
predictors of participants’ average perceptions of evil of the Focal Character. It was predicted 
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that hate, but not dislike, would be a strong predictor of perceptions of evil of the Focal 
Character.  
Results and Discussion 
 The first analyses presented for Study 1 are manipulation checks of the intentionality and 
responsibility portrayed in each of the conditions. These analyses were not presented as part of 
the data analysis plan. However, in preparing the data for analysis the comprehension check 
questions revealed that participants might have misinterpreted the comprehension questions 
(particularly the responsibility question), and therefore had misunderstood the manipulation 
check question (which were the same as the comprehension questions, except that they 
incorporated participants’ beliefs about the responsibility and intentionality of the Focal 
Character). Additionally, these analyses were performed to provide a potential interpretation for 
some unexpected results from the planned analyses. They were presented first because they 
inform the analyses that follow and therefore it is important to understand them before moving 
forward.  
 The first of these manipulation checks was performed on intentionality. After each 
scenario, participants were asked to indicate their belief that the Focal Character acted 
intentionally (this question was separate from the true/false comprehension check question which 
asked participants whether the act was intentional based on the information in the question). A 
composite score was calculated, averaging participants’ intentionality belief scores across the 
moral violations. A t-test comparing the intentional and unintentional conditions was conducted 
on the composite of participants’ intentionality belief ratings, revealing that intentional vignettes 
(M = 6.27; SE = .06) were perceived as more intentional than unintentional vignettes (M = 4.12, 
SE = .07), indicating that the manipulation of intentionality was successful, t(396) = 24.06, p  < 
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.001. A similar composite score was calculated for participants’ beliefs that the Focal Character 
was responsible for their actions. A t-test was conducted on this composite score comparing 
responsible and not responsible conditions, revealing that responsible vignettes (M = 5.59, SE = 
.08) were not perceived as significantly different than vignettes in which the character was not 
responsible (M = 5.46, SE = .09), indicating that the manipulation of responsibility was not 
successful, or that the question assessing this dimension did not adequately represent the 
intended dimension. In summary, of the two between subject variables, only intentionality was 
successfully manipulated and assessed. However, as will be demonstrated in the following 
analysis, responsibility was not rendered obsolete.  
 Before exploring the analyses for Study 1, it is noteworthy to mention that, while there 
were no predictions for effects of violation type for any of the analyses, multiple effects were 
observed throughout Study 1. These effects might signify a hierarchy for the differing violations, 
however, there are two important reasons to be cautious in accepting such an interpretation. The 
first is that each violation was represented by only one vignette. Therefore, the differences could 
be attributed to the stories themselves rather than the type of violation portrayed. The second is 
evidence from our own previous research. Across four different studies, we found that the 
violation type associated with hate was variable – in two studies it was based on harm and liberty 
violations, in another it was based on group and fairness violations, and in another it was based 
on purity violations (Merrick & Beike, 2019). In that research, the type of violation did not seem 
to matter as much as the perception that the offender was evil and the victim was motivated to 
avoid them. Therefore, while the effect of violation type might signify something meaningful, it 
could also be subject to change. In the interest of transparency, the results of these analyses, 
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including the effects of violation type are available in Tables 1-4 but they will not be otherwise 
reported here.  
 Hypothesis 1 is that responsibility and intentionality are both necessary for evil to be 
recognized, but neither is sufficient on its own. A 2 (responsible, not responsible)  2 
(intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, 
liberty) mixed model analysis of variance was conducted on the item measuring the perceived 
evil of the Focal Character (whose actions were manipulated). Contrary to predictions, there was 
no significant interaction between intentionality and responsibility of the Focal Characters 
actions. There was a main effect of intention, such that the Focal Characters in vignettes 
portraying intentional acts (M = 4.01, SE = .07) were perceived to be more evil than in vignettes 
portraying unintentional acts (M = 2.38, SE = .07), F(1, 394) = 262.24, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2  = .40. There 
was also a main effect of responsibility, such that the Focal Character in vignettes portraying the 
character as responsible for his actions (M = 3.37, SE = .07) were considered more evil than in 
vignettes portraying the character as not responsible for his actions (M = 3.02, SE = .07), F(1, 
394) = 12.05, p = .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .03. The prediction that both intentionality and responsibility are 
necessary for the perception of evil was not supported. However, the main effects of both 
intentionality and responsibility signifies that they may each be sufficient for the recognition of 
evil. Interestingly, despite the previous analysis revealing that the responsibility manipulation 
was not effective, in perceiving the evil of the Focal Character, participants did discern a 
difference in the vignettes in which the character was portrayed as responsible and those in 
which he was not. These results tend to support the argument that participants did not understand 
the question, rather than a failure of the concept.  
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An additional analysis to explore H1 consisted of computing participants’ average scores 
of intentionality of the Focal Characters’ actions, responsibility for the Focal Characters’ actions, 
and perceived evil of the Focal Characters across all vignettes. A simultaneous linear regression 
was then conducted that demonstrated that intentionality and responsibility were both significant 
predictors of evil, F(2, 395) = 102.22, p < .001 with an R2 = .34. Intentionality was a significant 
predictor of evil (p < .001), as was responsibility (p = .03). Again, because 
responsibility failed as a manipulation, it was unclear what (if any) differences participants 
perceived in those scenarios relative to the not responsible ones, but it is clear that the more 
participants believed the Focal Character was responsible for an immoral act, the more evil they 
perceived him to be.   
H2 is that hate and dislike differ in degree. A 2 (responsible, not responsible)  2 
(intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, 
liberty) x 2 (emotion type: anticipated hate, anticipated dislike) mixed model analysis of variance 
was conducted on anticipated emotion . Participants’ overall anticipated feelings of hate and 
dislike toward the Focal Character were different from each other. As predicted for Study 1, 
anticipated dislike (M = 4.51, SE = .06) was more intense overall than anticipated hate (M = 
3.55, SE = .07), F(1, 382) = 290.46, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .43. To understand these results, context is 
potentially crucial. The questions regarding hate and dislike asked participants to report how 
much hate and dislike they would experience as the victim of the story. As will be demonstrated 
in Study 2, people report resisting hate more than dislike and feeling that hate is more immoral 
than dislike, so it is possible that people thought they would experience less hate in a third-
person scenario because they perceived feeling hate to be wrong. Given potential concerns about 
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the social desirability of the question and people’s ability to control their emotions in imagined 
stories, the fact that people reported feeling more dislike than hate makes sense.  
H3 is that hate and dislike differ in kind. H3 was explored through the previous analysis 
that also provided evidence for H2, as well as a simultaneous regression.  First, the 2 
(responsible, not responsible)  2 (intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, 
fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, liberty) mixed model analysis of variance conducted on the 
item measuring anticipated feelings of hate and anticipated feelings of dislike was examined. 
Contrary to predictions, there was no two-way interaction between emotion and responsibility of 
the target (which is not surprising, given the initial analysis that showed no effect of the 
responsibility manipulation question), nor was there a two-way interaction between emotion and 
intentionality of the target.  
Support for H3 was also sought through a simultaneous linear regression which revealed 
that both anticipated feelings of hate and anticipated feelings of dislike were significant 
predictors of perceptions of evil of the target, F(2, 317) = 103.63, p < .001 with an R2 = .40. As 
predicted, anticipated hate was a significant predictor of evil (p  < .001). Contrary to 
predictions, however anticipated dislike also predicted evil (p < .001). Though this does 
not align fully with the predictions of H3, it is important to note that both anticipated hate and 
anticipated dislike independently predicted perceptions that the target was evil, indicating that 
hate and dislike differentially contribute to people’s notions about the presence of evil.  
To review, Study 1 provided partial support for H1, by revealing that people use 
intentionality and responsibility as sufficient dimensions by which they perceive evil, though 
they were not mutually necessary, as predicted. This support is complicated, however, by the fact 
that the manipulation or assessment of responsibility failed. H2 was supported by demonstrating 
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that people anticipated stronger feelings of dislike than hate in third-person scenarios. H3 was 
somewhat supported. Anticipated feelings of hate and dislike did not differ as expected in terms 
of intentionality and responsibility, as predicted, and hate did not have a stronger or singular 
relationship with evil. However, hate and dislike were revealed to have independent relationships 
with evil. Therefore, while it is unclear how they differ in kind, it is clear that they do.  
There were two goals of Study 2. First, Study 2 attempted to replicate the results 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 from Study 1 but with more external validity: participants provided their 
own experiences of hate and dislike (or the experiences of someone they knew) to determine if 
people use the same dimensions to decide who is evil. Second, Study 2 sought to answer the 
theoretically contradictory question about the relationship between hate and evil more closely – 
if hate informs us about evil, then how can it be evil to feel hate? This question was examined by 
manipulating different dimensions by which people might differentiate the positive and negative 
outcomes of hate, including the subject (self, other), the target (group, individual), and 
comparing these dimensions for hate and dislike to determine if and how the distinctions of hate 
differed from those of dislike. These dimensions were then examined as they related only to hate, 
to distinguish whether different kinds of hate were observed.  
Study 2 
Method 
 Participants. Eight hundred and twenty-five participants were recruited for the study. Of 
those, 16 failed to begin the experiment and nine were excluded based on the a priori exclusion 
criteria, by answering the question about their hate or dislike experience with nonsense (e.g., “2;” 
“FFF”). The final sample for Study 2 included 141 University of Arkansas students who 
completed the online survey through Qualtrics in exchange for partial fulfillment of a research 
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requirement; and 660 Mechanical Turk workers recruited through TurkPrime and compensated 
one dollar for their participation based on a ten-dollar hourly rate. The participants included 383 
females, 395 males, three who indicated other, and 20 who chose not to reveal their gender. They 
ranged in age from 18 to 75 with a mean age of 34.60. Eighty percent of participants were White, 
7% were Black, 8% were Asian, 6% were Latinx, 1% were Native American, 1% were Pacific 
Islander, and 1% indicated other. Participants could choose more than one ethnicity. Sample size 
was predetermined at 800 participants, or 100 participants per cell.   
Procedure. Study 2 was completed online. Participants first completed an informed 
consent which was recorded on a separate survey from the rest of their responses to preserve 
anonymity. After beginning the survey, participants were prompted to provide an example of an 
emotional experience and respond to corresponding questions. This study employed a 2 
(emotion: hate, dislike)  2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: group, individual) between 
subjects design. Participants described an example of a time they or someone they knew 
experienced either hate or dislike toward a group or individual. In the Other condition 
participants also provided the name of the person who experienced either hate or dislike. The 
Other’s name was then piped into the following questions to minimize participant confusion.  
After providing and describing an experience, participants answered a series of questions. 
The first set of questions included questions about the subject’s experience and perceptions about 
the target (either a group or a person). In the Self conditions, these questions asked for the 
intensity of participants’ own emotions and judgments (e.g. “How intensely did you feel hate 
toward the person?”). In the Other conditions, the questions asked for the intensity of the Other’s 
emotions and judgments (e.g. “How intensely did you perceive the person to feel hate toward the 
person?”). These questions were answered on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). An 
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example is included below that demonstrates the items for the Self/Group/Hate condition. The 
questions pertaining to threat and immorality of the target were not analyzed for the current 
study but will be explored at a later date. Participants indicated the intensity of the following 
items, either about the self or the person they witnessed experiencing the indicated emotion:  
“hate toward the group” 
“dislike toward the group” 
“threatened by the group”  
“the group was evil” 
“the group did something on purpose” 
“the group had a choice about their actions” 
“the group was immoral” 
The next set of questions pertained to the morality of the subject of the emotional 
experience (either self or other) and measured the possible consequences of experiencing hate or 
dislike toward a group or person. These items were matched to emotion condition, so that the 
items in the dislike condition asked about dislike (e.g. “I resisted feeling dislike toward the 
group”) and items in the hate condition asked about hate (e.g. “I resisted feeling hate toward the 
group”). An example of the items is included below that demonstrates the items for the 
Self/Group/Hate condition. The first three items of this set of questions were filler questions and 
were not subject to analysis. Participants rated their agreement with to the following items on a 
scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 (very strongly agree):  
“By experiencing hate toward the group, I activated evil in myself” 
“By experiencing hate toward the group, I could have infected others with evil” 
By experiencing hate toward the group, I could have harmed others” 
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“I resisted feeling hate toward the group” 
“It was wrong for me to feel hate toward the group” 
After answering questions about the target, about the subjective experience, and about the 
consequences of experiencing hate or dislike on the subject, participants indicated their desired 
action tendency. This was done through two different questions. The first question that addressed 
action tendency included two slider scales from one to 100 that asked participants to indicate 
their present desire to approach the target and avoid the target. The second set of items asked 
participants how much they would like to engage in the action tendency (approach or avoid) at 
the time of the experience, and asked them to specify the motivation for the action tendency, of 
which there were three options: to harm the target, to protect the self from further harm, or to 
avoid consequences. An example of this question is available below for the Self/Group/Hate 
condition. Participants indicated their desire to execute each of the following actions from 1 (not 
at all) to 7 (a great deal): 
“confront or attack this group because you wanted to cause them pain or harm” 
“confront or attack this group because you wanted to protect yourself from further harm”  
“confront or attack this group because you wanted to avoid the consequences of staying 
away from them” 
“stay away from this group because you wanted your absence to cause them pain or 
harm”  
“stay away from this group because you wanted to protect yourself from further harm”  
“stay away from this group because you wanted to avoid the consequences of confronting 
or attacking them”  
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After participants described the experience and answered the corresponding questions, 
they answered the same personality and beliefs measures from Study 1. Once again, these 
measures were not included in the analyses of this study but will be analyzed at a later time. 
These measures included the Moral Vitalism Scale (Bastian et al., 2015), the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), items regarding beliefs about evil, and items about 
consequences for bad people. Finally, participants completed demographic measures and were 
then debriefed and paid (Mechanical Turk workers) or administered research credit (students) for 
participation. The materials for Study 2 are available in Appendix C.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The measures of interest for Study 2 included the intensity of hate, the intensity of 
dislike, desire to approach the target, desire to avoid the target, the evil of the target, the 
wrongness of experiencing the emotion, the resistance to feeling the emotion, the intentionality 
of the target, and the responsibility of the target. Evil of the target, wrongness of the emotion, 
and resistance to the emotion were each subject to a 2 (emotion experience: hate, dislike)  2 
(subject: self, other)  2 (target: group, individual) between subject analysis of variance. 
Emotion intensity (intensity of hate and dislike) was treated as a within subjects variable, and 
entered into the same 2 (emotion experience: hate, dislike)  2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: 
group, individual)  2 (emotion intensity: hate, dislike) mixed model analysis of variance. 
Desire to approach and avoid the target were also treated as a within subjects variable, and 
entered into a 2 (emotion experience: hate, dislike)  2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: group, 
individual)  2 (action tendency: approach, avoid) mixed model analysis of variance. These 
analyses are described in terms of the hypotheses.  
42 
 
Hypothesis 1, that evil is recognized in immoral acts that are intentional and in which the 
offending person is responsible for his or her actions, was addressed with a regression analysis 
similar to one from Study 1. Participants’ ratings of the intentionality and responsibility of the 
target were entered as simultaneous predictors of their perception that the target was evil. It was 
hypothesized that both intentionality and responsibility would predict participants’ perceptions of 
evil of the target.  
Hypothesis 2 is that hate and dislike differ in degree. Support for H2 would include main 
effects of emotion experience for any of the outcome measures of interest. Specifically, the target 
of hate was predicted to be more evil, more responsible for their actions, more intentional than 
the targets of dislike, and hate was predicted to have a stronger action tendency than dislike. 
Additionally, hate experiences were predicted to be wrong to experience, more resisted, and to 
activate higher intensity of negative emotions (hate and dislike) than dislike experiences.  
Hypothesis 3 is that hate and dislike differ in kind. There were two types of evidence 
intended to support H3. The first was a simultaneous regression in which it was predicted that 
hate, but not dislike, was a strong predictor of perceptions of evil of the target, though based on 
the results of Study 1, it would not be surprising if dislike was also a predictor of perceptions of 
evil of the target. If it was found that hate and dislike are both predictors of evil, it would support 
H2, that hate and dislike differ in intensity.  
Support for H3 would also include any two-way interactions in the analyses of variance 
between emotion experience (hate, dislike) and subject (self, other), emotion experience and 
target (individual, group), or emotion experience and reported emotional intensity (hate, dislike) 
would indicate a difference in kind between hate and dislike for the following outcome 
measures: evil of the target, wrongness of feeling the emotion, resistance to feeling the emotion, 
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hate and dislike intensity, and action tendency. The specific nature of these are covered under 
subsequent predictions.  
First, the 2 (emotion: hate, dislike) 2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: group, 
individual) analysis of variance conducted on participants ratings of evil of the target was 
anticipated to produce a two-way interaction between emotion and subject and target. Mean 
comparison was predicted to reveal that the target of hate experienced by the self was considered 
more evil than dislike experienced by the self or the target of any of the other’s experiences.  
Next, the 2 (emotion experience: hate, dislike) 2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: 
group, individual) analysis of variance conducted on participants ratings of how wrong it was to 
experience the emotion was expected to produce a three-way interaction between emotion 
experience, subject, and target. Mean comparison was expected to reveal that others’ hate toward 
groups was more wrong than their dislike toward any target, across all levels of subject. A two-
way interaction was predicted between emotion and subject, such that others’ experiences of hate 
were more wrong than their experiences of dislike or any of the self’s experiences. A two-way 
interaction was also predicted between emotion and target, such that hate toward groups is more 
wrong than dislike toward either target.  
Next, the 2 (hate, dislike) 2 (self, other)  2 (group, individual) analysis of variance 
conducted on participants’ ratings of how strongly the subject resisted the negative emotion was 
expected to produce a two-way interaction between emotion and subject. Mean comparison was 
predicted to reveal that the self is more likely to resist hate than dislike, and any emotion that the 
other experiences.  
Next, the 2 (emotion experience: hate, dislike) 2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: 
group, individual)  2 (emotion intensity: hate intensity, dislike intensity) mixed model analysis 
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of variance was predicted to produce a two-way interaction, such that both hate and dislike 
intensity would be higher in hate experiences than dislike experiences.  
Finally, the 2 (emotion experience: hate, dislike) 2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: 
group, individual)  2 (action tendency: approach, avoid) mixed model analysis of variance was 
predicted to produce a two-way interaction, such that hate would have a stronger action tendency 
(and specifically, a stronger avoidance tendency) than dislike. It was subsequently predicted that 
hate would have a stronger action tendency than dislike and that both emotions would be 
characterized by a desire to avoid, rather than approach.  
Results and Discussion 
Planned Analyses. The measures of interest for Study 2 included the intensity of the 
emotions, the evil of the target of the experience, the wrongness of experiencing the emotion, the 
resistance to feeling the emotion, the intentionality of the target, and the responsibility of the 
target. Each of the dimensions above was subject to a 2 (hate, dislike) 2 (self, other) 2 
(group, individual) between subject analysis of variance. It is important to point out that hate and 
dislike intensity were measured as dependent variables as well as being independent conditions 
of the study. Participants described instances of either hate or dislike but were asked to provide 
the intensity of both emotions, regardless of condition. Additional analyses included two 
regressions similar to those conducted in Study 1: one in which hate and dislike intensity were 
used to predict evil of the target, and another in which intentionality and responsibility were used 
to predict evil of the target. The results of the analyses were discussed in terms of the specific 
hypotheses rather than in order of the analyses for clarity. Because the analyses were discussed 
in terms of the hypotheses, the results of interest for each of the analyses of variance are the main 
effects of emotion type and any interactions between emotion type and the other variables (as 
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outlined in the data analyses plan). Therefore, while there are many main effects of the other 
variables throughout the analyses, these are not discussed in the results in order to reduce 
cognitive load on the reader. Analysis of variance tables, including the main effects that are not 
discussed in the results, are available in Tables 5-9 so that the analyses can be viewed in 
complete form.  
Hypothesis 1, that evil is recognized in immoral acts that are intentional and in which the 
offending person is responsible for his or her actions, was addressed with a simultaneous 
regression analysis similar to one from Study 1. Participants’ ratings of the intentionality and 
responsibility of the target were entered as simultaneous predictors of their perception that the 
target was evil, which was found to be significant, F (2, 783) = 107.55, p < .001 with an R2 = 
.22. As predicted, intentionality was a strong predictor of evil (p < .001), while 
responsibility was only a marginally significant predictor of evil (p = .07). This analysis 
replicates the results from Study 1 and once again suggests that intentionality seems very 
important to the perception of evil, while responsibility is less so. Once again, it is unclear 
whether it was the language that confused participants (i.e., does everyone understand the word 
responsibility the same way?) or if there is another dimension that is important to the attribution 
of evil. In Study 1, perceptions of evil were greater in intentional and responsible vignettes, 
though the responsibility manipulation failed. This, along with the regression analyses suggest 
that responsibility is either misunderstood or is not related to evil. The fact that the Focal 
Characters in the responsible vignettes were still considered more evil than the ones that were 
not suggests that there is a dimension that is important to participants, but that they do not 
recognize it as responsibility.  
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Hypothesis 2 is that hate and dislike differ in degree. Support for H2 would include main 
effects of emotion experience for any of the outcome measures of interest. A 2 (hate experience, 
dislike experience) 2 (self, other)  2 (group, individual) analysis of variance was conducted 
on each of the outcome measures. Results included main effects of emotion for four outcome 
variables that revealed differences in the intensity of hate and dislike. Participants reported that 
the target of emotional experiences were more evil for hate (M = 4.36, SE = .10) than dislike (M 
= 3.65, SE = .10), F(1,778) = 24.64, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .03. They also reported that it was more 
wrong to experience hate (M = 3.61, SE = .10) than dislike (M = 2.99, SE = .10), F(1,778) = 
21.33, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .03, and relatedly that they were more likely to resist hate (M = 2.93, SE = 
.08) than dislike (M = 2.49, SE = .08), F(1,778) = 15.22, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .02. Another analysis of 
interest included a 2 (hate experience, dislike experience) 2 (self, other)  2 (group, 
individual)  2 (emotion type: anticipated hate, anticipated dislike) mixed model analysis of 
variance was conducted on anticipated emotion. For this analysis, hate and dislike experiences 
were once again manipulated as an independent variable, but they were also measured as an 
outcome variable. Therefore, two main effects were predicted for this analysis. One of the 
emotion experience (hate and dislike) and the other for the intensity of the emotions that 
accompanied that experience (hate and dislike). There was a main effect of condition, such that 
hate experiences (M = 5.71, SE = .07) were accompanied by more intense negative emotions 
than dislike experiences (M = 5.10, SE = .07), F(1,778) = 40.02, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .05. There was 
also a main effect of emotion intensity, such that dislike intensity (M = 5.95, SE = .05) across all 
emotional experiences was more intense than hate intensity (M = 4.86, SE = .06), F(1,778) = 
474.07, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .38. Together, these main effects suggest that hate experiences are 
characterized by more intense negative emotions, but that the subjective feeling of dislike is 
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more intense than the feeling of hate. There were no main effects of emotion for the other 
variables, including intentionality of the target and responsibility of the target.  
Additional evidence that hate and dislike differ in degree was observed in the analyses 
regarding action tendency. A 2 (hate experience, dislike experience) 2 (self, other)  2 (group, 
individual) 2 (approach, avoid) mixed model analysis of variance was conducted. First, there 
was a main effect of action tendency, such that both hate and anger were characterized by 
avoidance (M = 71.82, SE = 1.12) , rather than approach (M = 28.18, SE = 1.11) F(1, 778) = 
578.82, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .43.  More interestingly though, there was a main effect of emotion such 
that hate experiences (M = 51.63, SE = .92) had a stronger action tendency than dislike 
experiences (M = 48.37, SE = .91), F(1, 778) = 6.27, p = .01, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .008. Though both means 
were close to the midpoint, hate had a significantly stronger action tendency than dislike which 
differentiates hate and dislike in degree.  
Hypothesis 3 is that hate and dislike differ in kind. There were two types of evidence 
intended to support H3. The first was a simultaneous regression in which it was revealed that 
hate and dislike were both predictors of evil F(2, 783) = 165.00, p < .001 with an R2 = .30. Hate 
was a significant predictor of evil (p  < .001), as predicted. Contrary to predictions (but 
consistent with Study 1), dislike was also a significant predictor of evil (p  < .001). 
Though dislike was not anticipated to be a predictor of evil, it is important to note that both hate 
and dislike independently predicted perceptions that the target was evil, indicating that hate and 
dislike differentially contribute to people’s notions about the presence of evil. 
As argued in the data analysis plan, differences in hate and dislike in kind would be 
demonstrated by two-way interactions in the analyses of variance that were proposed. There 
were no differences in kind between hate and dislike for perceptions that the target was evil, 
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intentionality of the target, responsibility of the target, or that the subject resisted feeling the 
emotion. There were interactions of interest in the 2 (hate experience, dislike experience) 2 
(self, other)  2 (group, individual)  2 (hate intensity, dislike intensity) mixed model analysis 
of variance. First, there was a two-way interaction between hate and dislike intensity (the within 
subjects measures of hate and dislike) and subject (self, other), F(1, 778) = 8.69, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = 
.01. An analysis of simple effects with a Bonferroni correction revealed that the self experienced 
more intense dislike (M = 6.02, SE = .06) than hate (M = 4.77, SE = .08), F(1, 778) = 325.03, p < 
.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .30. Others also experienced more intense dislike (M = 5.89, SE = .07) than hate 
intensity (M = 4.94, SE = .09), F(1, 778) = 167.18, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .18. There was not a 
significant difference in the experience of the self and other.  There was also a two-way 
interaction between emotion intensity (the within subjects measures of hate and dislike) and 
emotion experience (the between subjects measures of hate and dislike), F(1, 778) = 52.81, p < 
.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .06. An analysis of simple effects with a Bonferroni correction revealed that hate 
intensity was significantly higher in hate experiences (M = 5.34, SE = .09) than in dislike 
experiences (M = 4.37, SE = .09) as expected, F(1, 778) = 64.02, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .08. Dislike 
intensity was also higher in hate experiences (M = 6.07, SE = .07) and dislike experiences (M = 
5.84, SE = .07), F(1, 778) = 6.53, p = .01, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .008.  
 Additional evidence that hate and dislike differ in kind was observed in the analyses 
regarding action tendency. A 2 (hate experience, dislike experience) 2 (self, other)  2 (group, 
individual) 2 (approach, avoid) mixed model analysis of variance revealed a two-way 
interaction of action tendency and emotion, F(1, 778) = 7.10, p = .008, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .009. An analysis of 
simple effects with a Bonferroni correction revealed that hate was significantly more likely to 
have an approach action tendency (M = 32.33, SE = 1.58) than dislike (M = 24.14, SE = 1.56), 
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F(1, 778) = 13.28, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .02. There was no significant difference in hate and dislike for 
avoidance action tendency.  
Collectively, the analyses comparing hate and dislike revealed some differences between 
the two, which are not just based on intensity, but also on kind, as the results of Van Bavel et al. 
(2018) suggested, though support for this hypothesis was much weaker than the support for H2, 
that hate and dislike differ in degree. Study 2 did not provide the evidence initially expected in 
regard to Hypotheses 1 and 3 but the results did confirm the same patterns anticipated from 
Study 1. H1 was partially supported, in that evil of the target was predicted by perceptions of 
intentionality of the target’s actions. However, contrary to H1 (but similar to Study 1), 
responsibility of the target was not a significant predictor of perceptions of target evil. H2 was 
supported by several main effects. It was revealed that experiencing hate is more wrong, more 
resisted, and more likely to occur in response to target evil than dislike. H3 was supported by 
hate experiences being characterized by more intense feelings of hate than dislike experiences, 
while intensity of dislike was similar for both experience types. Hate and dislike intensity also 
differed by subject, in that the self experienced similar intensity of dislike to others, but less 
intense hate. Additionally, hate experiences were characterized by a stronger action tendency 
than dislike experiences.  
 Exploratory Analyses. There was one additional hypothesis that was not adequately 
addressed by the planned analyses. Hypothesis 4 is that there are two distinct types of hate, one 
that is justified and one that is not. These distinctions were predicted to include the following: (a) 
hate toward groups is more wrong than hate toward individuals (particularly when experienced 
by others), (b) that others’ hate is morally worse than the self’s hate, and (c) that the target of the 
self’s hate is more evil than the target of others’. In the planned analyses of Study 2, hate was 
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compared to dislike, so it was not possible to look for distinctions in types of hate. Therefore, 
some of the analyses from Study 2 were repeated, including only the participants who answered 
questions about hate. These analyses include 390 participants that did not differ significantly in 
gender, race, or age from the excluded participants.  
 H4(a) is that hate toward groups is more wrong than hate toward individuals (particularly 
when experienced by others). A 2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: group, individual) analysis of 
variance was conducted on the variable measuring how wrong it was to experience hate. As 
predicted, a main effect of target revealed that it was considered more wrong to hate groups (M = 
3.84, SE = .14) than to hate individuals (M = 3.38, SE = .14), F(1,387) = 5.15, p =.02, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .01.  
Furthermore, there was a two-way interaction between subject and target, F(1,387) = 5.55, p 
=.01, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .01. Subsequent simple effects tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that others 
hate toward groups (M = 4.66, SE = .29) was worse than others’ hate toward individuals (M = 
3.73, SE = .20), F(1,387) = 9.80, p =.002, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .03, or the self’s hate toward groups (M = 3.02, 
SE = .20), F(1,387) = 31.47, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .08. There was no difference in hate experienced by 
the self toward groups (M = 3.02, SE = .20) or individuals (M = 3.04, SE = .19).  
 The second part of H4 is that others’ hate is morally worse and less justified than the 
self’s hate. Support for H4(b) would include main effects of subject for the previously described 
2 (subject: self, other)  2 (target: group, individual) analysis of variance conducted on the 
variable measuring how wrong it was to experience hate, as well as the analysis of how much the 
subject resisted. A main effect of subject on wrongness revealed that others (M = 4.19, SE = .15) 
were significantly more wrong for experiencing hate than was the self (M = 3.03, SE = .14), 
F(1,387) = 33.21, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .08. There was no main effect of subject or target on resistance 
to hate.  
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Relatedly, H4(c) is that the target of the self’s hate is worse than the target of others’ 
hate. As predicted, a main effect of subject revealed that the target of the self’s hate (M = 4.80, 
SE = .13) was more evil than the target of others’ hate (M = 3.92, SE = .14), F(1,387) = 20.70, p 
< .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .05.  
The results of the exploratory analyses support H4 and indicate that there are differences 
in hate. Hate toward groups is more wrong than hate toward individuals, especially when 
experienced by others. Furthermore, hate that others feel is less justified than hate felt by the self 
because it is more wrong. Finally, the target of hate for the self is more evil than the target of 
others’ hate. With the previously reported main effects of emotion from the planned analyses in 
which hate was both more wrong and more resisted than dislike, these results indicate that people 
justify their own hatred more than other people’s. The target of the emotion for the self is 
perceived to be worse, so naturally hating them is more justified than other people’s hate, which 
is considered more wrong. Additionally, people report that they resist negative emotions more 
than other people do. This seems to suggest a self-serving bias: the target of my emotions is more 
evil, so my negative emotions are justified, but even so I resist it more than you do.   
General Discussion 
 Though Studies 1 and 2 differed in their methodologies, and to some extent the 
hypotheses they tested, both were designed to identify the determinants of evil and examine the 
relationship between evil, hate, and dislike. Hypotheses 1-3 were tested across both studies, 
while Hypotheses 4 was only tested in Study 2.  
Hypothesis 1 was that the necessary determinants by which people identify evil in others 
are intentionality of the target and responsibility of the target for his or her actions. Both Studies 
1 and 2 revealed that intentionality of the target, but not responsibility of the target is a 
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determinant of the target’s evil, though neither study provided evidence that both are necessary 
for the determination of evil. The test of this in Study 1 was not executed as well as it should 
have been. The stories either did not sufficiently manipulate responsibility of the target, or 
people did not understand the intended concept of responsibility of the target (either because of 
language or because of a failure to differentiate responsibility from intentionality), or both. 
Regardless, Study 2 also indicated that responsibility of the target did not predict the perceived 
evil of the target.  
Hypothesis 2, that hate and dislike differ in degree, was supported by both studies. Based 
on my previous experiences studying hate, it was predicted that anticipated feelings of hate 
would be weaker in Study 1 than anticipated feelings of dislike, but that in recounting personal 
experiences, both hate and dislike intensity would be higher in hate experiences compared with 
dislike experiences. These patterns were supported for both Studies 1 and 2. Study 2 revealed 
that hate and dislike differed in degree in perceptions of evil of the target, resistance to feeling 
the emotion, wrongness of feeling the emotion, and that hate had a stronger action tendency than 
dislike.  
 Hypothesis 3 was that hate and dislike differ in kind. Regarding kind, there were few 
differences in Study 1 between hate and dislike, but importantly, Study 1 only measured 
participants’ anticipated feelings of hate and dislike, were they the victims or witnesses of 
wrongdoing. It was not a personal situation. Of note, though, is that in both Studies 1 and 2 
feelings of hate and dislike independently predicted participants’ perceptions that the target was 
evil. Study 2 revealed more about the differences of hate and dislike in kind, by comparing 
experiences of hate and dislike to one another. The target of hate was considered more evil than 
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the target of dislike. It was also considered more wrong to feel hate, and hate was more resisted 
than dislike.  
 Hypothesis 4 was that there are distinct types of hate. This hypothesis was supported by 
evidence that hate toward groups reveals more evil about the subject than hate toward 
individuals, especially when experienced by others. Additionally, others were considered more 
wrong in experiencing hate than the self, and others were less likely to resist feeling hate than the 
self. Finally, a target was considered more evil when they offended the self relative to a target 
who has offended someone else.  
Overall, the goal of these studies was to broaden our understanding of evil and hate by 
identifying the determinants of perceptions of evil in others, confirming the relationship between 
hate and dislike, and defining the complex relationship between hate and evil. In regard to the 
identification of the determinants of evil, despite the failed manipulation (or failure of 
participants to understand the question which assessed the manipulation), overall perceptions of 
intentionality and responsibility were both statistically significant determinants of evil in Study 
1. This analysis along with the failure of the manipulation question suggests that there might be a 
dimension related to responsibility that people recognize, but do not label with the term 
responsibility. This could be attributed to variation in how people interpret the meaning of the 
word responsibility, or an indication that there is another dimension that is important to 
perceptions of evil. Further research is needed to explore these dimensions more thoroughly.  
Contrary to predictions based on previous research (Van Bavel et al., 2018), hate and 
dislike differed much more in degree than in kind. While there were slight differences in hate 
and dislike in kind on items like resistance, wrongness of feeling, and evil of target, hate seemed 
to generally be worse in degree than dislike. Hate indicated more evil in the target, was more 
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wrong for the subject to feel, and was more resisted by the subject. However, the aforementioned 
dependent variables of interest were all moral in nature in Study 2 and in Study 1 the anticipated 
feelings of hate and dislike were in response to immoral acts. Therefore, the degree to which hate 
is worse than dislike appears to be a moral one. Additionally, in both studies hate and dislike 
independently predicted evil of the target, which indicates that they are, at least in part, 
differentially related to evil.  
Though hate and dislike did not differ as much in kind as was predicted on the moral 
outcome variables (wrongness of feeling, resistance, and evil of target), they did differ on action 
tendency. This outcome might provide an explanation for the failure of the moral dimensions and 
an important distinction in the nature of hate and dislike. Action tendency is an important 
distinction between attitudes and emotions. Attitudes can be thought of as “enduring affective 
valuations”, whereas emotions are “occurrent affective reactions that mobilize relational 
behavior” (Gervais & Fessler, 2017, p. 3). In other words, attitudes are general evaluations while 
emotions are momentary reactions that incite action toward the object. In previous research, we 
demonstrated that hate behaves as an emotion in that it is brief and incites action (Merrick & 
Beike, 2019). Dislike has also been categorized as an emotion (Roseman, 1984), though it is 
more often thought of as an attitude (Collins, 1970; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 2014; Zimbardo, 
Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977). Attitudes have even been defined in terms of like and dislike, 
“attitudes are the core of our likes and dislikes for certain people, groups, situations, objects, and 
intangible ideas” (Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977, p.20). The current research 
demonstrated that hate and dislike differ in their action tendencies, such that hate is more likely 
to incite action than dislike supporting the idea that hate is an emotion while dislike is an 
attitude. That hate and dislike do not differ on moral determinants suggests that hate and dislike 
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may be part of the same higher affective system or sentiment, but the evidence that they differ in 
degree of action tendency suggests that they differ in kind of construct.  
Study 2 demonstrated a complex relationship between hate and evil. Several key findings 
revealed that value judgments are made about the target and the subject of hate that serve to 
justify (or deem unjustified) the emotion, and therefore determine which (the subject or target) is 
more evil. First, hating groups was revealed to be more wrong than hating individuals. This was 
expected, as hate toward groups often denotes prejudice and the more aggressive intergroup hate 
(Sternberg, 2003). Interestingly, though, groups were considered more evil than individuals. By 
itself, it is unsurprising that groups were considered more evil than individuals. This finding 
suggests that people are receptive to the concept of deindividuation, or the loss of self and 
morality associated with being subsumed by a group (Reicher, Spears, Postmes, 1995). Groups 
have more power and more influence, and therefore it makes sense that they are considered more 
evil. However, taken together with the previous finding that hating groups is more wrong than 
hating individuals reveals an interesting paradox. Groups are more evil than individuals, and yet 
it is more evil to feel hate toward groups. This conundrum highlights the original research 
question, if hate reveals what is evil,  how can it be wrong to feel hate? It seems that both are 
possible – hate can reveal what is evil, but that doesn’t make it justified. The key to this 
conundrum is the two-way interaction that was observed. It is wrong to hate groups, but 
especially when someone else hate groups. An important distinction is made between the self 
and other. Hate is safer in my hands than in yours.  
Relatedly, Study 2 also revealed that others’ hate is more wrong than the self’s hate. 
When combined with the findings that the target of the self’s hate was considered more evil than 
the target of others’ hate, it once again suggests that the self’s hate is more justified than 
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someone else’s. The justification for the self’s hate has thus far only been applied to hate toward 
groups but might also be considered for individuals. Research has demonstrated that stereotypes 
are used as justification for prejudice toward groups – even in the absence of specific violations 
(Crandall, Bahns, Warner, & Schaller, 2011). There are two important ways in which these 
findings support the current research. First, if evil is used as the basis of a stereotype, then hating 
someone or some group might feel justified based on that categorization. This would apply to 
both individuals and groups. Second, is the justification itself. People know that prejudice is 
wrong, so they feel the need to justify it and use stereotypes to do so. In the case of hate, people 
believe that feeling hate is wrong, so they feel the need to justify the feeling.  
This explanation encompasses the justification of the self’s hate. However, the present 
research also demonstrates that people do not justify others’ hate. That people justify their own 
hate but not the hate of others suggests an attribution error, or at least a difference in how people 
perceive their own hate relative to someone else’s (Jones & Nisbett, 1987). How positively the 
self is viewed is a key factor in self-evaluation (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). If people generally 
categorize hate as evil (Halperin, 2008), but then feel hate, they are motivated to evaluate the 
hate as justified by deeming the target to be evil. This enables them to avoid negatively 
evaluating the self. On the other hand, they are not motivated to do this for others, and so their 
hate is considered more evil, their target less evil, and therefore their hate is less justified.  
Together,  Study 2 provides evidence that people use dissonance reduction to justify their 
hate. People have a notion that it is wrong to experience hate so when they do, they justify the 
hate by relying on character assumptions about the target. When others experience hate, it must 
be a reflection of the character of the subject, rather than of the target. The paradox between self 
and other indicates that the most important criterion for defining the two types of hate might not 
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be whether the hate is toward a group or individual (though there are differences), or whether the 
hate is justified or unjustified. Rather, we might make assumptions about justified and unjustified 
hate based on our attempts to reduce dissonance. The paradox between self and other also 
indicates something about the balance of evil in hate. It suggests a revolving attribution of evil – 
the evil shifts from the subject to the target depending on the justification for the hate. For the 
self, hate is a necessary evil to combat evil of the target. For the other, it is giving in to evil 
within, since the target is not evil enough to justify it.  
Limitations  
One limitation of this research is the questions that were meant to differentiate 
intentionality and responsibility. In Study 1, participants seemed to understand that there were 
differences in responsible and not responsible vignettes regarding evil, though the questions that 
checked the manipulation apparently failed. Therefore, it is possible that the concept itself was 
successful, but the language of the question was ineffective at capturing the difference between 
responsibility and intentionality. Future research could address this limitation by administering 
the same vignettes to participants but asking them different questions about the responsibility 
and intentionality of the Focal Character (e.g. “How blameworthy was the Focal Character?”), to 
see if it is the concept or the question that is ineffective.  
A limitation of Study 2 is that there are likely confounds between the types of groups and 
individuals that participants reported feeling emotions toward. For instance, someone who hates 
a political figure (e.g., Donald Trump) might be using that person to symbolically represent an 
entire group (e.g., Republicans). This confound could be addressed by looking more specifically 
at the individuals and groups that participants reported feeling dislike or hate toward and coding 
for group/person type, and whether the group is achieved or ascribed (Allport, 1954). A similar 
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confound is possible in the self/other condition in Study 2. Based on the attribution bias, it is 
likely that people are more apt to disclose an unacceptable target for others than for the self (e.g., 
someone else hates Black people. I hate racists) (Jones & Nisbett, 1987). Therefore, the social 
acceptability of hatred toward the group should also be coded. This coding would not be as 
effective for coding responses toward individuals, as those answers are generally someone the 
participant knows, and therefore would be impossible to decipher without further information.  
Future Directions 
The current set of studies provides new information about evil and hate which sets the 
foundation for new studies. Study 2 provided some evidence that there are different types of 
hate, or at least that people have different perceptions about hate, based on who is feeling it and 
the target toward which it is felt. Additional studies should look more closely at the distinction 
between these hates by examining their motivations and their consequences. An extension of this 
particular study would benefit from additional questions that capture the ideas of justification of 
hate and whether that differs based on the subject or target of hate. Another future direction from 
this set of studies comes from the conclusion that hate and dislike differ in degree much more 
than they differ in kind. If so, it would be interesting to know whether the difference of degree in 
hate and dislike is based on degrees of evil.  
Conclusions 
 This pair of studies examined the determinants of evil and the relationship between evil, 
hate, and dislike. Together, they demonstrate that evil is perceived in actions that are intentional. 
They also demonstrate that hate and dislike differ much more in degree than in kind, but that 
their difference of kind is based on their relationship with evil. Furthermore, a closer look at hate 
and evil revealed a complex relationship. the relationship between hate and evil is 
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unquestionably complex. Hate informs us about what is evil more than dislike, so it must serve a 
purpose, and yet hate is considered more wrong than dislike. The target of my hate is more evil 
than the target of other people’s, and yet I resist hate more than they do. The original research 
question posed here was this: if hate informs us about what is evil, then how can it be wrong to 
feel hate? Rather than answer this question, however, this research has changed it from a 
question to a paradox. Hate informs us about what is evil, and yet it is wrong to feel hate.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Study 1 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Perceived Evil of Focal Character  
(Full Sample) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Between       
 Intention 1 1585.83 1585.83 262.24 <.001 .40 
 Responsible 1 72.84 72.84 12.05 .001 .03 
 Intention*Responsible 1 .61 .61 .10 .75 <.001 
Within       
 Violation 5 1165.89 233.18 126.87 <.001 .24 
 Violation*Intention 5 549.98 110.00 59.85 <.001 .13 
 Violation*Responsible 5 63.22 12.64 6.88 <.001 .02 
 Violation*Intention*    
 Responsible 
5 11.69 2.34 1.27 .27 .003 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 2 
Study 1 Repeated Measures ANOVA for Anticipated Hate and Dislike toward Focal Character  
(Full Sample) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Between       
 Intention 1 2451.96 2451.96 160.0
0 
<.001 .30 
 Responsible 1 4.18 4.18 .273 .602 .001 
 Intention*Responsible 1 15.15 15.15 .99 .32 .003 
Within       
 Violation 5 1041.08 208.22 59.92 <.001 .14 
 Violation*Intention 5 1398.42 279.68 80.49 <.001 .17 
 Violation*Responsible 5 64.34 12.87 3.70 .002 .01 
 Violation*Responsible*    
 Intention 
5 45.22 9.04 2.60 .02 .007 
 Emotion 1 1073.33 1073.33 290.46 <.001 .43 
 Emotion*Responsible 1 .15 .15 .04 .84 <.001 
 Emotion*Intention 1 10.37 10.37 .281 .10 .007 
 Emotion*Responsible*    
 Intention 
1 5.78 5.78 1.57 .21 .004 
 Violation*Emotion 5 13.54 2.71 3.62 .003 .009 
 Violation*Emotion*  
 Responsible 
5 1.32 .26 .35 .88 .001 
 Violation*Emotion*  
 Intention 
5 11.65 2.33 3.12 .008 .008 
 Violation*Emotion*  
 Responsible*Intention 
5 4.03 .81 1.08 .37 .003 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 3 
Study 1 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Perceived Evil of Focal Character 
(Sample with Exclusion Criterion Applied) 
Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Between       
 Intention 1 167.27 167.27 29.47 <.001 .10 
 Responsible 1 5.64 5.64 .99 .32 .004 
 Intention*Responsible 1 <.001 <.001 <.001 .99 <.001 
Within       
 Violation 5 113.56 22.71 12.43 <.001 .05 
 Violation*Responsible 5 31.32 6.27 3.43 .004 .01 
 *Violation*Intention 5 24.20 4.84 2.65 .02 .01 
 *Violation*Responsible    
 *Intention 
5 15.49 3.10 1.7 .13 .007 
**p<.01 
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Table 4 
Study 1 Repeated Measures ANOVA for Anticipated Hate and Dislike  
(Sample with Exclusion Criterion Applied) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Between       
 Intention 1 221.86 221.86 15.22 <.001 .06 
 Responsible 1 2.40 2.40 .17 .685 .001 
 Intention*Responsible 1 .005 .005 <.001 .99 <.001 
Within       
 Violation 5 94.55 18.91 5.10 <.001 .02 
 Violation*Intention 5 116.18 23.24 6.27 <.001 .03 
 Violation*Responsible 5 23.12 4.62 1.25 .29 .005 
 Violation*Responsible  
 *Intention 
5 14.89 2.97 .80 .55 .003 
 Emotion 1 59.43 59.43 18.18 <.001 .08 
 Emotion*Responsible 1 5.08 5.08 2.76 .10 .01 
 Emotion*Intention 1 1.35 1.35 .74 .39 .003 
 Emotion*Responsible   
 *Intention 
1 5.50 5.50 2.99 .09 .01 
 Violation*Emotion 5 37.35 7.47 6.75 <.001 .03 
 Violation*Emotion*  
 Responsible 
5 9.12 1.82 1.65 .15 .007 
 Violation*Emotion 
 *Intention 
5 7.55 1.51 1.36 .24 .005 
 Violation*Emotion*  
 Responsible*Intention 
5 11.79 2.36 2.13 .06 .009 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 5 
Study 2 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Evil of Target 
(Full Sample) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Subject 1 99.85 99.85 25.40 <.001 .03 
Target  1 33.23 33.23 8.45 .004 .01 
Emotion 1 96.87 96.87 24.64 <.001 .03 
 Subject*Target 1 1.04 1.04 .26 .61 <.001 
 Subject*Emotion 1 5.78 5.78 1.47 .23 .002 
 Target*Emotion 1 3.05 3.05 .78 .38 .001 
 Subject*Target*  
 Emotion 
1 4.41 4.41 1.12 .29 .001 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 6 
Study 2 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Wrongness of Emotion  
(Full Sample) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Subject 1 248.87 248.87 70.08 <.001 .08 
Target 1 88.99 88.99 25.06 <.001 .03 
Emotion 1 75.76 75.76 21.33 <.001 .03 
 Subject*Target 1 46.30 46.30 13.04 <.001 .02 
 Subject*Emotion 1 .42 .42 .13 .72 <.001 
 Target*Emotion 1 .51 .51 .15 .70 <.001 
 Subject*Target*  
 Emotion 
1 4.79 4.79 1.42 .23 .002 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 7 
Study 2 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Resistance of Emotion  
(Full Sample) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Subject 1 24.72 24.72 9.73 .002 .01 
Target 1 10.88 10.88 4.28 .04 .005 
Emotion 1 38.67 38.67 15.22 <.001 .02 
 Subject*Target 1 .36 .36 .14 .71 <.001 
 Subject*Emotion 1 1.12 1.12 .44 .51 .001 
 Target*Emotion 1 .05 .05 .02 .89 <.001 
 Subject*Target*  
 Emotion 
1 10.98 10.98 4.32 .04 .006 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 8  
Study 2 Repeated Measures ANOVA for Hate and Dislike Intensity 
(Full Sample) 
Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Between       
 Subject 1 .18 .18 .05 .82 <.001 
 Emotion 1 142.41 142.41 40.02 <.001 .05 
 Target 1 4.59 4.59 1.29 .26 .002 
 Subject*Emotion 1 8.96 8.96 2.52 .11 .003 
 Subject*Target 1 .90 .90 .25 .62 <.001 
 Emotion*Target 1 2.35 2.35 .66 .42 .001 
 Subject*Emotion*  
 Target 
1 .50 .50 .14 .71 <.001 
Within       
 EmoIntensity 1 471.56 471.56 474.07 <.001 .38 
 EmoIntensity*Subject 1 8.64 8.64 8.69 .003 .01 
 EmoIntensity*Emotion 1 52.53 52.53 52.81 <.001 .06 
 EmoIntensity*Target 1 3.38 3.38 3.40 .07 .004 
 EmoIntensity*Subject  
 *Emotion 
1 1.01 1.01 1.01 .31 .001 
 EmoIntensity*Subject   
 *Target 
1 .30 .30 .30 .58 <.001 
EmoIntensity*Emotion*
Target 
1 2.09 2.09 2.10 .15 .003 
 EmoIntensity*Subject  
 *Emotion*Target 
1 .62 .62 .62 .43 .001 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 9 
Study 2 Repeated Measures ANOVA for Approach and Avoidance Action Tendency 
(Full Sample) 
Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Between       
 Subject 1 479.92 479.92 .73 .39 .001 
 Emotion 1 4131.12 4131.12 6.27 .01 .008 
 Target 1 153.87 153.87 .23 .63 <.001 
 Subject*Emotion 1 457.37 457.37 .69 .41 .001 
 Subject*Target 1 743.43 743.43 1.13 .29 .001 
 Emotion*Target 1 576.20 576.20 .88 .35 .001 
 Subject*Emotion*  
 Target 
1 69.07 69.07 .11 .75 <.001 
Within       
 Action 1 743372.30 743372.30 578.82 <.001 .43 
 Action*Subject 1 27699.12 27699.12 21.57 <.001 .03 
 Action*Emotion 1 9119.68 9119.68 7.10 .008 .009 
 Action*Target 1 4825.75 4825.75 3.76 .06 .005 
 Action*Subject*    
 Emotion 
1 52.72 52.72 .04 .84 <.001 
 Action*Subject*  
 Target 
1 3953.99 3953.99 3.08 .08 .004 
 Action*Emotion*  
 Target 
1 3689.69 3689.69 2.87 .09 .004 
 Action*Subject*  
 Emotion*Target 
1 3667.34 3667.34 2.86 .09 .004 
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Table 10 
Study 2 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Evil of Target 
(Hate Participants Only) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
 Subject 1 76.13 76.13 20.70 <.001 .05 
 Target  1 27.94 27.94 7.60 .006 .02 
 Subject*Target 1 4.82 4.82 1.31 .25 .003 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 11 
Study 2 Fixed Effects ANOVA for Wrongness of Emotion  
(Hate Participants Only) 
 Source df Sum 
Square 
Mean 
Square 
F p 𝒏𝒑
𝟐 
Subject 1 131.59 131.59 33.21 <.001 .08 
Target 1 20.41 20.41 5.15 .02 .01 
 Subject*Target 1 21.99 21.99 5.55 .02 .01 
**p < 0.01 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Study 1 Participants and Results (with exclusion criterion applied) 
Participants  
Participants included 179 University of Arkansas students, who completed the online 
survey through Qualtrics in exchange for partial fulfillment of a research requirement; and 83 
Mechanical Turk workers, recruited through TurkPrime and compensated for their participation 
based on a ten-dollar hourly rate. The participants included 121 female, 139 male, and two who 
chose not to answer. They ranged in age from 18 to 67 with a mean age of 25.89. Eighty nine 
percent of participants were White, 5% were Black, 4% were Asian, 5% were Latinx, less than 
1% were Native American, less than 1% were Pacific Islander, and less than 1% indicated other. 
Participants could choose more than one ethnicity. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1 is that responsibility and intentionality are both necessary for evil to be 
recognized, but neither is sufficient on its own. A 2 (responsible, not responsible)  2 
(intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, 
liberty) mixed model analysis of variance was conducted on the item measuring the perceived 
evil of the Focal Character (whose actions were manipulated). As predicted, there was a main 
effect of intention, such that the Focal Characters in vignettes portraying intentional acts (M = 
3.97, SE = .29) were perceived to be more evil than in vignettes portraying unintentional acts (M 
= 2.36, SE = .07), F(1, 256) = 29.47, p <.001, 𝑛𝑝
2  = .10. There was no a main effect of 
responsibility, though one was predicted.  
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An additional analysis to explore H1 consisted of computing participants’ average scores 
of intentionality of the Focal Characters’ actions, responsibility for the Focal Characters’ actions, 
and perceived evil of the Focal Characters across all vignettes. A simultaneous linear regression 
was then conducted that demonstrated that intentionality and responsibility were both significant 
predictors of evil, F(2, 257) = 52.70, p < .001 with an R2 = .29. Intentionality was a significant 
predictor of evil (p = .004). Responsibility was only a marginal predictor of evil 
(p = .067).  
H2 is that hate and dislike differ in degree. A 2 (responsible, not responsible)  2 
(intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, 
liberty) mixed model analysis of variance was conducted on the item measuring anticipated 
feelings of hate and anticipated feelings of dislike. Participants’ overall anticipated feelings of 
hate and dislike toward the Focal Character were different from each other. Anticipated dislike 
(M = 4.28, SE = .16) was more intense overall than anticipated hate (M = 3.61, SE = .21), F(1, 
248) = 18.18, p < .001, 𝑛𝑝
2 = .07.  
H3 is that hate and dislike differ in kind. H3 was explored through the previous analysis 
that also provided evidence for H2, as well as a simultaneous regression.  First, the 2 
(responsible, not responsible)  2 (intentional, unintentional)  6 (moral foundations: harm, 
fairness, ingroup, authority, purity, liberty) mixed model analysis of variance conducted on the 
item measuring anticipated feelings of hate and anticipated feelings of dislike was examined. 
Contrary to predictions, there was no two-way interaction between emotion and responsibility of 
the target (which is not surprising, given the initial analysis that showed no effect of the 
responsibility manipulation), nor was there a two-way interaction between emotion and 
intentionality of the target.  
80 
 
Support for H3 was also sought through a simultaneous linear regression revealed that 
both anticipated feelings of hate and anticipated feelings of dislike were significant predictors of 
perceptions of evil, F(2, 247) = 79.55, p < .001 with an R2 = .39. As predicted, anticipated hate 
was a significant predictor of evil (p < .001). Contrary to predictions, however 
anticipated dislike also predicted evil (p < .001).  
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Appendix B 
Study 1 – each of the vignettes is included for the different conditions. However, the questions 
for each scenario were the same so the questions will only be presented with the first scenario.  
[Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: intentional/responsible, 
intentional/not responsible, unintentional/responsible, unintentional/not responsible. All 
participants read and responded to six short scenarios. Scenarios were randomized.]  
Intentional (Responsible):  
Harm 
Benny goes out with to a bar one night with a friend, where his friend starts a fight and 
encourages Benny to join in. Benny excitedly joins in the fight and starts kicking a stranger 
while he’s on the ground. 
Benny hurt the stranger on purpose. 
Benny chose to hurt the stranger on his own.  
Fairness  
Floyd works for a politician, who doesn’t mind lying or fudging the numbers about his 
accomplishments. During the election, Floyd offers to distribute untrue, slanderous information 
about the opposing candidate to help his boss win. 
Floyd slandered the other candidate on purpose. 
Floyd chose to act unfairly on his own. 
Ingroup 
Arnold is part of a secret society. He has a friend who is not part of the society, and who asks 
him to share some secrets about his group that he isn’t supposed to tell. Arnold tells his friend 
the secrets of his group. 
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Arnold intentionally told his friend secret information about his group. 
Arnold chose to share the secret information on his own. 
Authority 
Jermaine goes with his friend to a rally protesting the government, where people are shouting 
and rioting in the streets. Jermaine excitedly joins in and starts yelling, breaking windows, and 
rushing at cops with the group. In the chaos, he knocks down a police officer. 
Jermaine knocked down the police officer on purpose. 
Jermaine chose to rebel on his own. 
Purity 
Ajay’s coworker tells him about a great group he’s a part of called Necrophilia’s Secret, a club in 
which members dedicate their bodies to the group after they die for members to have sex with. 
Ajay joins the group to have sex with corpses. 
Ajay had sex with the corpses on purpose. 
Ajay chose to desecrate the corpses he has sex with. 
Liberty 
Wilbur is very proud to be American, but his best friend is from Spain, and still a Spanish 
citizen. Wilbur’s dad suggests that it is unpatriotic for the friend not to become an American 
citizen. Wilbur demands that his friend give up his native citizenship and become an American 
citizen. 
Wilbur takes away his friend's choice on purpose. 
Wilbur is responsible for his actions. 
Intentional (Not responsible):  
Harm 
83 
 
Benny goes out with to a bar one night with a friend, where his friend starts a fight and 
encourages Benny to join in. Benny excitedly joins in the fight and starts kicking a stranger 
while he’s on the ground.   
Benny hurt the stranger on purpose. 
Benny chose to hurt the stranger on his own.  
Fairness  
Floyd works for a politician, who doesn’t mind lying or fudging the numbers about his 
accomplishments. During the election, Floyd distributes slanderous information about the 
opposing candidate that he believes to be true to help his boss win. 
Floyd slandered the other candidate on purpose. 
Floyd thought the information was true, so he was not responsible for acting unfairly. 
Ingroup 
Arnold is part of a secret society. He has a friend who is not part of the society, and who asks 
him to share some secrets about his group that he isn’t supposed to tell. Arnold doesn’t want to 
offend his group, so tells his friend something about the group that he doesn’t think is a secret, 
but which is actually very sensitive information that he wasn’t supposed to tell.  
Arnold intentionally told his friend information about his group. 
Arnold didn’t realize the information was secret, so he is not responsible for sharing the 
secrets.  
Authority 
Jermaine goes with his friend to a rally protesting the government, where people are shouting 
and rioting in the streets. Jermaine gets caught up in the mob mentality and starts yelling, 
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breaking windows, and rushing at cops with the group. In the chaos, he knocks down a police 
officer. 
Jermaine knocked down the police officer on purpose. 
Jermaine was affected by the mob mentality and therefore he was not responsible for his 
actions. 
Purity 
Ajay’s coworker tells him about a great group he’s a part of called Necrophilia’s Secret, a club in 
which members dedicate their bodies to the group after they die for members to have sex with. 
Ajay joins the group to have sex with corpses. 
Ajay had sex with corpses on purpose. 
The people consented so Ajay was not responsible for harming them. 
Liberty 
Wilbur is very proud to be American, but his best friend is from Spain, and still a Spanish 
citizen. Wilbur’s dad suggests that it is unpatriotic for the friend not to become an American 
citizen. Wilbur demands that his friend give up his native citizenship and become an American 
citizen. 
Wilbur takes away his friend’s choice on purpose. 
Wilbur doesn’t realize how much it means to his friend to be a Spanish citizen, so he is 
not responsible for violating his friend’s choice. 
Unintentional (Responsible)  
Harm 
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Benny goes out with to a bar one night with a friend, where his friend starts a fight and 
encourages Benny to join in. Benny does not join the fight, but accidentally shoves someone to 
the ground because he wasn’t paying attention to where he was going. 
Benny accidentally hurt the stranger. 
Benny should have been paying attention so he’s responsible for harming him. 
Fairness  
Floyd works for a politician, who doesn’t mind lying or fudging the numbers about his 
accomplishments. During the election, Floyd accidentally distributes untrue, slanderous 
information about the opposing candidate. 
Floyd accidentally damages the reputation of the candidate. 
Floyd didn’t check his sources, so he is responsible for acting unfairly. 
Ingroup 
Arnold is part of a secret society. He has a friend who is not part of the society, and who asks 
him to share some secrets about his group that he isn’t supposed to tell. Arnold doesn’t want to 
offend his group, so tells his friend something about the group that he doesn’t think is a secret, 
but which is actually very sensitive information that he wasn’t supposed to tell.  
Arnold accidentally told his friend information about his group that he didn’t realize was 
secret. 
Arnold didn’t ask anyone if he could share the information, so he is responsible for 
sharing the secrets. 
Authority 
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Jermaine goes with his friend to a rally protesting the government, where people are shouting 
and rioting in the streets. Jermaine does not join in the rioting, but in the chaos he accidentally 
runs into a police officer and knocks him down. 
Jermaine accidentally knocked down the police officer. 
Jermaine chose to be at the rally, so he is responsible for his actions. 
Purity 
Ajay works at a mortuary. His coworker does not respect the dead and is often violent with the 
corpses. Ajay is not disrespectful, but sometimes he has sex with his girlfriend in the same room 
as the corpses. 
Ajay accidentally did something impure. 
Ajay chose to have sex in the same room as the corpses, so he is responsible for his 
actions. 
Liberty 
Wilbur is very proud to be American, but his best friend is from Spain, and still a Spanish 
citizen. Wilbur’s dad suggests that it is unpatriotic for the friend not to become an American 
citizen. Wilbur demands that his friend give up his native citizenship and become an American 
citizen. 
Wilbur thinks he is suggesting the best option, but in doing so, he accidentally takes away 
his friend’s choice. 
Wilbur should have asked his friend how he felt, so is responsible for his actions.   
Unintentional (Not responsible)  
Harm 
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Benny goes out with to a bar one night with a friend, where his friend starts a fight and 
encourages Benny to join in. Benny does not join the fight, but accidentally shoves someone to 
the ground while he was trying to get away. 
Benny accidentally hurt the stranger. 
Benny was trying to get away, so he is not responsible for his actions. 
Fairness  
Floyd works for a politician, who doesn’t mind lying or fudging the numbers about his 
accomplishments. During the election, Floyd accidentally distributes untrue, slanderous 
information about the opposing candidate. 
Floyd accidentally damages the reputation of the candidate. 
Floyd thought the information was true, so he was not responsible for acting unfairly. 
Ingroup 
Arnold is part of a secret society. He has a friend who is not part of the society, and who asks 
him to share some secrets about his group that he isn’t supposed to tell. Arnold doesn’t want to 
offend his group, so tells his friend something about the group that he doesn’t think is a secret, 
but which is actually very sensitive information that he wasn’t supposed to tell.  
Arnold accidentally told his friend information about his group that he didn’t realize was 
secret. 
Arnold didn’t know the information was secret, so he is not responsible for his actions. 
Authority 
Jermaine goes with his friend to a rally protesting the government, where people are shouting 
and rioting in the streets. Jermaine does not join in the rioting, but in the chaos he was shoved 
and accidentally runs into a police officer and knocks him down. 
88 
 
Jermaine accidentally knocked down the police officer. 
Jermaine was not trying to harm the officer, so he is not responsible for his actions. 
Purity 
Ajay works at a mortuary. His coworker does not respect the dead and is often violent with the 
corpses. Ajay is not disrespectful, but sometimes he has sex with his girlfriend in the same room 
as the corpses. 
Ajay accidentally did something impure. 
Ajay doesn’t think it’s gross to have sex near the corpses, so he is not responsible for 
doing something impure. 
Liberty 
Wilbur is very proud to be American, but his best friend is from Spain, and still a Spanish 
citizen. Wilbur’s dad suggests that it is unpatriotic for the friend not to become an American 
citizen. Wilbur demands that his friend give up his native citizenship and become an American 
citizen. 
Wilbur thinks he is suggesting the best option, but in doing so, he accidentally takes away 
his friend’s choice. 
Wilbur doesn’t realize how much it means to his friend to be a Spanish citizen, so he is 
not responsible for violating his friend’s choice. 
Questions for all vignettes 
Please answer the following true/false questions, based on the information provided above. 
[Focal Character] acted on purpose. 
[Focal Character] chose to act the way he did. 
Please answer the following questions based on your interpretation of the scenario above.  
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To what extent do you believe the following  
[from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal)] 
[Focal Character] acted on purpose. 
[Focal Character] chose to act the way he did. 
Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements  
[from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)] 
[Focal Character]'s friend is evil 
[Focal Character] is evil 
If you were the victim of this situation how much would you feel  
[from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal)] 
hate toward [Focal Character]? 
dislike toward [Focal Character]? 
hate toward [Focal Character]’s friend? 
dislike toward [Focal Character]’s friend? 
Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements  
[from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)] 
[Focal Character] is infected by his friend’s immorality 
[Focal Character]'s own immorality is awakened by his friend’s 
[Focal Character] chooses to act immorally 
[Focal Character] is immoral in this situation, but not generally 
Moral Vitalism Scale 
Please rate your agreement with each of the following items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree).  
90 
 
1. There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world  
2. Either the forces of good or the forces of evil are responsible for most of the events in the 
world today  
3. The forces of good and evil often motivate human behavior  
4. People need to be aware of the good and evil that are in this world today  
5. Good and evil are aspects of the natural world  
Evil Measures 
Please rate your agreement with each of the following items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree).  
6. Everyone has evil in them 
7. Only some people have evil in them, but it is contagious and might spread to others 
8. Only some people have evil in them, and it is not contagious 
9. No one has evil in them 
10. Evil is a choice 
11. People can be evil in the right situation 
12. Other (please specify) 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this 
scale 
[0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and 
wrong) [1] = not very relevant; [2] = slightly relevant; [3] = somewhat relevant; [4] = very 
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relevant; [5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right 
and wrong) 
______11. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
______12. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
______13. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
______14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
______15. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
______16. Whether or not someone was good at math 
______17. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
______18. Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
______19. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
______20. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
______21. Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
______22. Whether or not someone was cruel 
______23. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
______24. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
______25. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
______26. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of  
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or 
disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
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______27. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
______28. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
______29. I am proud of my country’s history. 
______30. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
______31. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
______32. It is better to do good than to do bad. 
______33. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
______34. Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
______35. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something 
wrong.   
______36. Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
______37. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
______38. It can never be right to kill a human being. 
______39. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. 
______40. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
______41. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
______42. Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
Bad People 
Please read the following statements and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
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       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
Bad people should be... 
1. punished 
2. harmed so they can’t harm others 
3. harmed so they can’t harm the self 
4. left alone 
5. avoided so they can’t harm others 
6. avoided so they can’t harm the self 
 
Demographics 
Demographic Information 
Gender: Male Female Other 
Age (in years): 
Ethnicity (choose all that apply): 
White/Caucasian 
Black/African American 
Asian/Asian American 
Hispanic/Latinx 
Native American 
Pacific Islander 
Other 
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Appendix C 
Study 2 – Two prompts are presented below: one that was presented to answer questions about 
the self, and the other to answer questions about another person. The questions were tailored to 
condition (e.g. “how intensely did you feel hate toward the person?”) but to save space only one 
set of questions is presented here. The remaining questions are available upon request.  
Self Conditions 
Think of a time you experienced hate[dislike] toward a group[individual].  
What[who] was the group[individual]?  
Describe what it was that made you experience hate toward the group at the time.  
Other Conditions 
Think of a time someone you know experienced hate[dislike] toward a group[individual].  
 What is name of the person who experienced hate[dislike]?  
What[who] was the group[individual]?  
Describe what it was that made you experience hate toward the group at the time.  
Questions for all participants 
How intensely did you[other person] feel...?  
[from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal)] 
hate toward the group[individual] 
dislike toward the group[individual] 
threatened by the group[individual] 
the group[individual] was evil 
the group[individual] did something evil 
the group[individual] was immoral 
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the group[individual] did something on purpose 
the group[individual] was purposely bad 
the group[individual] is responsible for their actions 
the group[individual] is responsible for the way they are 
Please rate your agreement with each of the following items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree).  
By experiencing hate[dislike] toward the group[individual], I[other] activated evil in 
myself 
By experiencing hate[dislike] toward the group[individual], I[other]  could have 
infected others with evil 
By experiencing hate[dislike] toward the group[individual], I[other] could have 
harmed others 
I[other]  resisted feeling hate[dislike] toward the group[individual] 
It was wrong to experience hate[dislike] toward this group[individual] 
It is wrong to feel hate[dislike] toward a group[individual] 
After you experienced dislike toward the group, to what extent did you want to... 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) 
 confront or attack this group[individual] because you wanted to cause them pain or harm 
 confront or attack this group[individual] because you wanted to protect yourself from  
further harm 
 confront or attack this group[individual] to avoid the consequences of staying away from  
them 
stay away from this group[individual] because you wanted your absence to cause them  
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pain or harm 
stay away from this group[individual] because you wanted to protect yourself from  
further harm 
stay away from this group[individual] to avoid the consequences of confronting or  
attacking them 
Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 100 how much you wanted to... 
Approach the group[individual] 
Avoid the group[individual] 
[See Appendix B for the remaining scales] 
Moral Vitalism Scale  
Evil Measures  
Moral Foundations Questionnaire  
Bad People Measures  
Demographics 
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